The question of being (Greek, τό ὄν, the present participle of the verb ειναι, «to be»; Latin, esse; German, Sein; French, être), in philosophy, has been a central topic of metaphysics; the study of «being» is called ontology.[1]
Philosophers often suppose a certain sense of being as primary, and from it derive other senses of being as secondary. So, even if they use the same word «is,» the meaning of being is different, depending upon what it is that «is»: sensible material beings, values and norms, principles, mathematical objects, quality, time, space, God, etc. For Plato the primary kind of being is the immutable world of ideas, while for Aristotle it is the mutable world of substances. In another context, however, Aristotle put one immutable substance, God, as the principle of all being, and Thomas Aquinas, too, conceived God as the primary being, from which all other beings in the world receive their existence. Materialists conceive material or a sensible entity as the primary model of being, while idealists regard thought or spirit as primary. Most philosophers, including Aristotle, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, were aware of these diverse senses of being.
Inquiries into being often contrast it with its reciprocal concept, and the meaning of being varies accordingly. Paired sets include: being and becoming, being and non-being, being and appearance or phenomena, being and existence, being and essence, being and beings, being and thought, and being and ought.
How to approach the question of being is determined by the style of thought, philosophical approach, or methodology. For example, the phenomenological approaches of Husserl and Heidegger locate the question of being on the horizon of human consciousness and existence. Eastern philosophies emphasize the role of «non-being» for our understanding of being.
Many philosophical and religious traditions seem to agree that elucidating the nature of being discloses a fundamental distinction between an essential world and a resultant world of phenomena. They also seem to agree that each of the two worlds has diversity within itself with some kind of purposiveness. Yet they give different answers to the question of which of the two worlds is more real.
A History of the Notion of Being in the West
The pre-Socratic question of being
The pre-Socratic Greeks had a more direct, non-conceptual, and non-objectifying approach to the question of «being,» as compared with the rather indirect approach of Plato and Aristotle that attempted to conceptualize and objectify «being» through instantiated forms or formed matter.
For the pre-Socratics, the most important question to be answered was: What is the world made of? In answering this question, they were immediately convinced that all things in the world are identical in nature with one another. Hence, they successively attempted to reduce the world in general to water (Thales), then to air (Anaximenes), then to fire (Heraclitus), until Parmenides finally said that the whole world is made of «being» (to on, the present participle of the verb einai, «to be.») Parmenides’ answer was more persuasive because while it was not at once evident that water, air, and fire are completely identical, it was undeniable that they all have in common the property of being, because they all are. Being, then, was considered to be the fundamental and ultimate element of all that is.
What, then, is «being»? It turned out to be a difficult question to answer indeed. The question of what water, air, or fire is, looked much easier because the definition of any of these was quite self-evident. So, Parmenides did not discuss what being is, but instead highlighted the fact of being as the truth and characterized being as one, all-inclusive, whole, unborn, timeless, immobile, immutable, permanent, and imperishable. His dictum: That which is, is, while that which is not, i.e., «non-being» (to me on), is not: «The one way, assuming that being is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the trustworthy path, for truth attends it. The other, that not-being is and that it necessarily is, I call a wholly incredible course, since thou canst not recognise not-being (for this is impossible), nor couldst thou speak of it.»[2] Thus, any individual things that look mutable and perishable in the world are our illusory perceptions, and they do not belong to the realm of being.
Usually contrasted with Parmenides’ notion of being as the ultimate principle that is immutable and eternal, is Heraclitus’ understanding of fire as the ultimate element of reality, according to which the whole of reality is mutable and transitory like fire. For Heraclitus, everything is in flux and becoming, and immutability or stability is illusory. Perhaps the only sense in which he was able to talk about true being was this unchanging principle of transitory passage and its cyclicality.
Plato and Aristotle
Plato differentiated between the immutable world of ideas or forms and the transitory world, saying that the former is an eternal, incorporeal realm of ideas and values that are true beings, while the latter is a less real, ephemeral, «shadowy» world of material things that are far from true beings and subject to change and decay. This way, Plato struck a compromise between Parmenides’ notion of being and Heraclitus’ theory of becoming, although for Plato the world of ideas is more important than the transitory world. Both are linked through the participation of the latter in the former, and the latter’s degree of reality is determined by how much material things partake and manifest ideas which are true reality. The latter world, while being thus differentiated from the former, is also differentiated from the realm of non-being that is unformed matter; it constitutes an intermediate stage of becoming between being and non-being. Plato treated all this in his Phaedo, Republic, and Statesman.
For Aristotle, the science of «being qua being» (on hēi on) was what he called «first philosophy,» as is discussed in his Metaphysics.[3] but his understanding of being was quite different from Plato’s. For Aristotle, only individual things, called substances, are fully beings, while other things such as quantity, quality, relation, place, and time, called categories, have a derivative kind of being, dependent on individual substances. Thus, all senses of being are derived from a single central notion, the notion of «substance» (ousia, the feminine genetive of to on, which in turn is the present participle of the verb einai, «to be»). According to him, however, whereas each individual substance is a mutable thing composite of two correlative principles: form and matter, or, in more general terms, actuality and potentiality, there is one immutable substance, God, who is pure form devoid of matter. God as the highest genus of substance is therefore the principle of all being and dealt with also in first philosophy.
Medieval philosophers
Medieval philosophy basically followed the Aristotelian understanding of the various senses of being in reality, although the Latin equivalent to the Greek to on is ens («being»), the present participle of sum («I am»). Esse («to be») is the present infinitive. Another related term is essentia («essence»), an abstract form of the present participle of esse, referring to what a substance (substantia) is in itself.
One new development in Medieval philosophy was the distinctive notion of existentia («existence,» from the verb exsistere, which means to «to exist,» «to appear,» or «to emerge»). Greek ontology apparently did not have it, since its primary focus was the matter of predication based on copula sentences of the form «X is Y.» The best Aristotle came up with based on the primarily predicative verb einai was the distinction between hoti esti («that it is») and ti esti («what it is»), which could mean «existence» and «essence,» respectively. Medieval philosophy, however, developed the notion of existence distinctively under the influence of Islamic philosophy, which distinguished existence (wujud) from essence (mahiat) in light of a biblical metaphysics of creation within Islam which differentiated the contingent existence of the created world from the necessary status of God. Thomas Aquinas adopted this, maintaining that the essence and existence of each and every contingent, finite creature are distinct, while essence and existence are identical within God, who is therefore preeminent over the world. Thus, even when rejecting Anselm’s ontological proof for God’s existence that had argued that to know what God is (his essence) is to know that God exists (his existence), Aquinas did not reject the identification of God’s essence and God’s existence.
Interestingly, according to Aquinas, because of his preeminent status over the world, God is now «the first being» (primum ens), and each and every individual creature is a «participated being» (ens per participationem) which derives its being from God as the first being.[4] Thus, although God and creatures are not totally similar, they are at least proportionately similar, i.e., analogical in their relationship through the «analogy of being» (analogia entis). Duns Scotus, however, denied this, suggesting the univocity of being, although he still recognized that God as ens a se («being from itself») and creatures as entia ab alio («beings derived from another») are two different aspects of being.
Modern philosophers
Empiricists and materialists in modern philosophy such as Thomas Hobbes took a sensible material thing as the model of being and identified sensibility or physicality as the primary sense of being. This perspective of being has been dominant throughout modern times.
At the same time, there were also rationalists and idealists who did not agree with empiricists and materialists. Baruch Spinoza, a rationalist with his pantheistic recognition of only one «substance» (God or Nature, Deus sive Natura), regarded this «substance» (substantia) as the primary sense of being and referred to «mode» (modus) as the derivative sense of being, ontologically and conceptually derivative from the former. For substance is «that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself,» while mode is «the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and conceived through, something other than itself.»[5] Thus, substance and mode are two main senses of being, although Spinoza suggested that being itself has, in the strict sense, no proper definition.
For absolute idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, «being» coincides with «thought,» because the subject matter of philosophy is the life of the Absolute Spirit, self-thinking Thought, as manifested panentheistically in the universe. The Absolute Spirit manifests itself in the universe by going out of itself and returning to itself. This life of the Absolute Spirit has three main phases: itself, nature, and the human spirit; and they are dealt with by logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit, respectively. Thus, logic deals with how the Absolute Spirit conceives of itself before the creation of the universe. Logic begins with «being» (Sein), which is the most immediate and indeterminate concept the Absolute Spirit can formulate about itself. But, being is so completely indeterminate that it passes over into «non-being» or «nothing» (Nichts), its negation, which is also completely indeterminate. Non-being also easily moves back to being. So, a third category, «becoming» (Werden), is posited, which is the synthesis, at a higher level, of being as thesis and non-being as antithesis. While being and non-being are wholly indeterminate abstractions, becoming is «the first concrete thought,»[6] thus being able to become «determinate being» (Dasein), which is a definite being. Although notions such as being «in itself» (an sich), being «for itself» (für sich), and being «in and for itself» (an und für sich) are also developed from determinate being, the original dialectic of being, non-being, and becoming is the starting point of the whole dialectic life of the Absolute Spirit that involves all other senses of being through the triads of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis at various phases and sub-phases.
Husserl and Heidegger
In the late nineteenth century, Edmund Husserl recognized that various kinds of being such as normative beings, values, space, time, mathematical objects, logical objects, historical object, and others do exist in different senses. Husserl gained this insight probably from his teacher Franz Brentano who had elaborated it in his On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. Husserl, thus, developed phenomenology as a philosophical methodology which can describe multiple senses of being as the world of the «transcendental ego» or «pure consciousness.» For example, in describing in which sense «time» exists, Husserl inquired into how time presents itself to us and developed a phenomenology of time.[7] Similarly, for all kinds of objects, Husserl inquired into how each of them presents its sense of being to human subjects. Although Husserl did not finish this project, he at least laid the foundation of its philosophical methodology.
Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, took the question of being (ontology) as the primary subject of philosophy. Heidegger complained that the question of being has failed to be answered in the long philosophical tradition in the West because since Plato and Aristotle the notion of being has always been conceptualized and objectified through instantiated forms or formed matter. He, however, appreciated pre-Socratics’ approach to the direct disclosure (aletheia in Greek) of being, and suggested that for this kind of direct disclosure of «being» (Sein), the human being should be thrown to the phenomenal world of «beings» (Seiendes) as Dasein (literally «being-there»). By being confronted with «non-being» (Nichts) there, the human being experiences dread about death (the negation of being) and grasps the meaning of being in beings. His methodology of inquiring into the meaning of being is called hermeneutic phenomenology, resulting from a combination of phenomenology and hermeneutics. In his inquiry into the meaning of being, Heidegger explicated the roles of death and conscience, teleological interdependence of being, and other unique elements. For Heidegger, the word «existence» (Existenz) is simply synonymous with Dasein: «The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.»[8]
Existentialists such as Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre inquired into unique modes of being of human beings, and explored complex elements involved in human existence, which includes freedom, authenticity/inauthenticity, anxiety, commitment, death, good and evil, faith, fate, and others. For existentialists, the meaning of being is intertwined with axiological and aesthetic elements.
The Notion of Being in Non-Western Traditions
The Hebrew Bible
The Hebrew equivalent to the English word «to be» is hayah. But, it is hardly used as predicative or as existential. For the predicative purpose, the so-called noun clause is used without copula most likely; and for the existential purpose, the particle yēš («there is»), which is no longer a verb, is used most likely. Therefore, in most cases the verb hayah means «to come to be» or «to come to pass.» This does not mean that this verb is equivalent to the English verb «to become.» So, for example, «the earth was waste» (Genesis 1:2), where hayahis, the past tense of hayah, is used, actually does not mean to equate «the earth» and «waste,» but to show that «the earth came to be waste,» if not that «the earth became waste.» It is interesting to observe that the Hebrew verb hayah shows an act more dynamic than the English verb «to be.»
Eastern philosophies
Eastern philosophies, while having the notion of «being» like Western thought does, have tended to recognize the notion of «non-being» more than Western thought does. Hinduism distinguishes between being (sat) and non-being (asat), equating the former with the enduring reality of Brahman, the supreme cosmic power, and the latter with the illusory unreality of the manifested universe. Hinduism, however, has another, diametrically opposed use of these terms especially in its mysticism, where non-being (asat) means that boundless and eternal metaphysical expanse of void even beyond Brahman and the universe because of which even being (sat) itself is and endures.
Buddhism accepts the Buddha’s teaching that everything in the world is marked by three main characteristics: 1) «impermanence» (anitya in Sanskrit; anicca in Pali), which not only means that everything will eventually cease to exist, but also that everything is in flux; 2) «unsatisfactoriness» (duhkha in Sanskrit; dukkha in Pali), which means that nothing in the world can bring lasting satisfaction; and 3) «non-self» (anatman in Sanskrit; anatta in Pali), which rejects the Hindu notion of «self» (atman). Mahayana Buddhism extends the third characteristic of «non-self» from sentient beings to all kinds of objects in the world. The three characteristics as a whole, therefore, mean that nothing in the world possesses permanent, essential identity, and also that all things, in that regard, are dependent on each other (pratityasamutpada in Sanskrit, meaning «dependent origination»). For Mahayana Buddhism, this means a virtual rejection of the metaphysical notion of being itself or «own-being» (svabhava in Sanskrit). A doctrine of «emptiness» (sunyata from the Sanskrit adjective sunya, meaning «empty»), therefore, has been developed to show this insight into reality, so we may be led to a realm of wisdom and inner peace where we acquire the Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhatu in Sanskrit).
According to Taoism, Tao («Way») is the primordial state of oneness which unites various things in the world that emerge from it. Lao Tzu often referred to the pair of «being» (yu) and «non-being» (wu), saying that both are contained within Tao. Neo-Daoist Wang Bi of the third century C.E., however, identified Tao with non-being and believed it to be the background of the world of being.
Multiple Senses of Being in a Paired Set of Concepts
As has been noticed above, being can often be paired with another concept and the sense of being differs according to what it is paired with. The pairs listed below are some of those often discussed in the history of philosophy. These pairs, however, often overlap and they are not mutually exclusive.
Being and becoming
Being, when it is contrasted with becoming, means immutability, permanence, or constant. Parmenides considered being to be the first principle of reality, believing that only being is, and that non-being is not. Also, everything is one, and the one is being, which is continuous, all-inclusive, and eternal. For him, becoming is illusory and impossible. By contrast, Heraclitus regarded becoming as the first principle, maintaining that everything is in a state of flux. Plato is considered to have reconciled between being and becoming by integrating the immutable world of ideas and the transitory world of material things through the notion of participation.
Being and non-being
Being means immutable, actual existence, while non-being refers to non-existence, according to Parmenides. However, the contrast between being and non-being has been interpreted in various ways. For Plato, being refers to the immutable world of ideas (forms), while non-being is unformed matter; and these two are united to constitute the transient world of becoming. Hinduism often equates being with the enduring reality of Brahman, and non-being with the illusory unreality of the manifested universe. Mahayana Buddhism denies being in favor of non-being for our enlightenment. For Hegel, being and non-being are two opposing, completely indeterminate logical (and also ontological) categories, which however are integrated into a third category of becoming at a higher and determinate level. For Heidegger, being and non-being are no longer indeterminate categories, and non-being is instrumental for our grasp of the meaning of being.
Being and phenomena
Being, when it is contrasted with phenomena, means true reality in contrast to mere appearances or what appears to sense perception. Plato inquired into the true reality of being in contrast to what appears to our five senses. For Plato, the true reality of being has permanent, immutable ideas, which intellect alone can grasp. Things are beautiful, for example, by virtue of the idea of beauty which is true reality. What appears to our five senses is a less real, ephemeral appearance.
Being and existence
- Main article: Being and Existence
Being and existence are related and somewhat overlapping with respect to their meanings. Being means being in general, covering all senses of being, while existence usually represents only one sense of being, which means the actual being of the world of phenomena. In the Middle Ages, under the influence of Islamic philosophy that recognized the contingency of the created world as compared with God the creator, Scholastic philosophy used the Latin word «existere» («to exist» or «to appear») as distinct from «esse» («to be»), and from «essentia» («essence»), an abstract form of the present participle of «esse.» Hence the distinction of existence from being, and also from essence.
Being (existence) and essence
Being, when it is contrasted with essence, means actual existence, which is one sense of being. Actual existence means that a being exists, while its essence means that which makes what it is. Medieval theologians such as Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas argued that God is a unique being whose essence is its existence, while essence and existence are separable for all beings other than God. The biblical concept of God as «I am who I am» expresses the identity of essence and existence in God.
Being and beings
Being, when it is contrasted with beings, means existence in the sense of event or fact of to-be. Being means the fact of existence itself, while beings mean particular entities that exist. Heidegger, for example, stressed this distinction between being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes) in order to highlight the concept of being or to-be as a dynamic activity. In a different context, Medieval theologians distinguished between God as «being from itself» (ens a se) and particular creatures as «beings derived from another» (entia ab alio).
Being and thought
Being, when it is contrasted with thought, means the objective reality that is outside of the cognitive subject. Thought refers to ideas in the mind; and being refers to spatio-temporal, extra-mental existence. This contrast was used by modern philosophers who had an epistemological concern. The contrast of being and thought appeared within the question of how ideas or thoughts in the mind can be a real representation of the objective reality which exists outside of the mind. For idealists such as Hegel, thought and being are the same.
Is (being) and ought
Being or «is,» when it is contrasted with «ought,» means factuality in contrast to normativeness. Immanuel Kant, for example, distinguished prescriptive statements in morality, which use «ought» or «should» (sollen), in contrast to natural, descriptive statements which describe what things factually «are» (sein).
It is clear that the multiple sense of being has been almost universally recognized both in East and West perhaps with the exception of actualism in analytic philosophy. The distinction between an essential type of world and a phenomenal world is the most basic distinction, and a deity or ultimate being usually belongs to the former. The question of which of the two worlds is more real than the other is answered differently by different philosophical and religious schools, and even when the answer is that the phenomenal world is more real, the real status of a deity or ultimate being is far from questioned (as in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas). The essential type of world is further subdivided into a variety of entities such as Plato’s ideas and Aristotle’s categories. The phenomenal world is also subdivided into various beings ranging from spiritual entities like angels through humans to non-rational beings such as nonhuman animals, plants, and minerals.
There are at least two issues that attract our attention here. First, what sense can we make out of the basic distinction between an essential world and a phenomenal world? Second, what does the existence of various beings in the phenomenal world mean? The first issue seems to show that the world of phenomena is, after all, a manifestation, appearance, expression, unconcealment, creation, or emanation of the essential world that includes a deity or ultimate being. The second issue on various beings in the phenomenal world has often been treated in terms of what is called the «great chain of being» with God as its top,[9] and especially in the West it has usually been taken to mean that a world full of all possible beings is aesthetically more perfect than otherwise, and that God made such a world to show his perfection. Hence, while the first issue shows the act or movement of manifestation, the second one seems to show purposiveness in that act or movement. Pope John Paul II’s call for a renewed «philosophy of being» based on both faith and reason in his 1998 Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio, if from a Catholic perspective, is perhaps a reminder of these points among others.[10]
See also
- Being and existence
- Cogito ergo sum
- Meaning of life
- Metaphysics
- Ontology
- Indian philosophy
- Chinese philosophy
Notes
- ↑ Ontology is generally a central part of metaphysics. While some philosophers use metaphysics and ontology interchangeably, some make a sharp distinction. For example, Martin Heidegger distinguished between his «fundamental ontology» and metaphysics. During and after modern philosophy, metaphysics was used by many in the pejorative sense. (See the preface of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason for a description of the intellectual climate of his time.) Metaphysics generally covers a broad range of topics including questions of being, existence, becoming, essence, the first principles, freedom, the relationship between mind and matter, and others. For Kant, ontology is a part of a metaphysics, that he called «general metaphysics.» Thus, while ontology is traditionally the central aspect of metaphysics, some contemporary thinkers such as Heidegger refused traditional metaphysics while developing an ontology.
- ↑ Parmenides, ed. and translated by
Arthur Fairbanks,
«Fragments.» - ↑ Aristotle, Metaphysics, book IV, part 2. MIT Classics. Retrieved August 1, 2008.
- ↑ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part I, question 3, article 4. 1920, rev. ed. newadvent.org. Retrieved August 1, 2008.
- ↑ Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, part I, definitions III and V., Translated from the Latin by R.H.M. Elwes (1883), online MTSU. August 1, 2008.
- ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace. (Oxford University Press, 1975), 132.
- ↑ Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological studies of time resulted in his The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
- ↑ Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 67.
- ↑ Arthur O. Lovejoy. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Harvard University Press, 1976).
- ↑ John Paul II, 1998,Fides et Ratio. On the Relationship between Faith and Reason. Vatican Library. Retrieved August 15, 2008.
References
ISBN links support NWE through referral fees
- Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
- Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
- Brentano, Franz Clemens. On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. Translated by Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. ISBN 0520023463
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford University Press, 1975. ISBN 0198245122
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. ISBN 0060638508
- Husserl, Edmund. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. ISBN 0253200970
- Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. Harvard University Press, 1976. ISBN 0674361539
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
- Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Translated by R.H.M. Elwes. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
External links
All links retrieved January 17, 2022.
- «The Vocabulary of Ontology: Being,» Ontology. A Resource Guide for Philosophers.
- «The Concept of Existence: History and Definitions by Leading Philosophers,» Ontology. A Resource Guide for Philosophers.
- «Existence,» Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
General Philosophy Sources
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Paideia Project Online
- The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Project Gutenberg
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Assorted References
- structural definitions in metaphysics
- In condition
…contrast between “conditioned” and “absolute” being (or “dependent” versus “independent” being). Thus, all finite things exist in certain relations not only to all other things but possibly also to thought; i.e., all finite existence is “conditioned.” Hence, Sir William Hamilton, a 19th-century Scottish philosopher, spoke of the “philosophy of the…
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- In condition
philosophical interpretations by
- Aristotle
-
In Aristotle: Being
For Aristotle, “being” is whatever is anything whatever. Whenever Aristotle explains the meaning of being, he does so by explaining the sense of the Greek verb to be. Being contains whatever items can be the subjects of true propositions containing the word is, whether…
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-
- Dewey
-
In John Dewey: Being, nature, and experience
In order to develop and articulate his philosophical system, Dewey first needed to expose what he regarded as the flaws of the existing tradition. He believed that the distinguishing feature of Western philosophy was its assumption that true being—that which is…
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- Eckhart
- In Meister Eckhart
” Whereas God inherently possesses being, creatures do not possess being but receive it derivatively. Outside God, there is pure nothingness. “The being (of things) is God.” The “noble man” moves among things in detachment, knowing that they are nothing in themselves and yet aware that they are full of…
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- In Meister Eckhart
- Fichte
- In Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Early life and career
…mystical and theological theory of Being. Fichte was prompted to change his original position because he came to appreciate that religious faith surpasses moral reason. He was also influenced by the general trend that the development of thought took toward Romanticism.
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- In Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Early life and career
- Hegel
-
In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Logic
…think the notion of pure Being (the most abstract category of all), one finds that it is simply emptiness—i.e., Nothing. Yet Nothing is. The notion of pure Being and the notion of Nothing are opposites; and yet each, as one tries to think it, passes over into the other. But…
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- Heidegger
-
In Martin Heidegger: Being and Time
…Seinsfrage, or the “question of Being.” In an essay first published in 1963, “My Way to Phenomenology,” Heidegger put the Seinsfrage as follows: “If Being is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being mean?” If, in other words, there are many kinds of…
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In continental philosophy: Heidegger
…the nature of existence, or being.
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- Jaspers
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In Karl Jaspers: Transition to philosophy of Karl Jaspers
…be a subjective interpretation of Being, which—although prophetically inspired—attempted to postulate norms of value and principles of life as universally valid. As Jaspers’ understanding of philosophy deepened, he gradually discarded his belief in the role of a prophetic vision in philosophy. He bent all his energies toward the development of…
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- Parmenides
- In Parmenides
…a single eternal reality (“Being”), thus giving rise to the Parmenidean principle that “all is one.” From this concept of Being, he went on to say that all claims of change or of non-Being are illogical. Because he introduced the method of basing claims about appearances on a logical…
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- In Parmenides
- Plato
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In Western philosophy: Philosophy
“Being” in this context does not mean existence, but something specific—a human, a lion, or a house—being recognizable by its quality or shape.
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- Sartre
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In continental philosophy: Sartre
…recognized two primary modes of being: consciousness, which he called the “For-itself,” and the world of inert matter or things, which he called the “In-itself,” or “facticity.” For Sartre, the In-itself is first and foremost an obstacle to the For-itself’s drive toward self-actualization—as indeed are all other selves, which he…
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In Western philosophy: The existentialism of Jaspers and Sartre
Sartre too was concerned with Being and with the dread experienced before the threat of Nothingness. But he found the essence of this Being in liberty—in freedom of choice and the duty of self-determination. He therefore devoted much effort to describing the human tendency toward “bad faith,” reflected in perverse…
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role in
Eleaticism
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In Eleaticism
…is a static plenum of Being as such, and nothing exists that stands either in contrast or in contradiction to Being. Thus, all differentiation, motion, and change must be illusory. This monism is also reflected in its view that existence, thought, and expression coalesce into one.
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- denial of Not-Being
- In denial of Not-Being
…Parmenides of Elea that only Being exists and that Not-Being is not, and can never be. Being is necessarily described as one, unique, unborn and indestructible, and immovable.
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- In denial of Not-Being
- Zeno’s paradoxes
- In paradoxes of Zeno
…that the assertion that only Being is leads to the conclusions that Being (or all that there is) is (1) one and (2) motionless. The opposite assertions, then, would be that instead of only the One Being, many real entities in fact are, and that they are in motion (or…
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- In paradoxes of Zeno
- Eleatic One
- In Eleatic One
…of Parmenides of Elea that Being is one (Greek: hen) and unique and that it is continuous, indivisible, and all that there is or ever will be.
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- In Eleatic One
- existentialism
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In existentialism: Nature of existentialist thought and manner
, of its mode of being); it is, therefore, also the investigation of the meaning of Being. (3) That investigation is continually faced with diverse possibilities, from among which the existent (i.e., the human individual) must make a selection, to which he must then commit himself. (4) Because those possibilities…
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- Islamic philosophy
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In Islam: Distinction between essence and existence and the doctrine of creation
…inquiry into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence and existence. He argued that the fact of existence cannot be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things and that form and matter by themselves cannot interact and originate the movement of the universe…
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In Islam: The teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā
…Intelligences (divine names) that are Being’s first, highest, and purest actualization or activity. This “extension” unites everything other than the Creator into a single continuum. The human body–soul complex and the heavenly body–soul complex are not moved externally by the Intelligences. Their movement is an extension of the process of…
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- Neoplatonism
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In Platonism: Neoplatonism: its nature and history
…a plurality of levels of being, arranged in hierarchical descending order, the last and lowest comprising the physical universe, which exists in time and space and is perceptible to the senses.
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- phenomenology
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In phenomenology: Basic principles
…the relationship between consciousness and Being, and in doing so, he must realize that from the standpoint of epistemology, Being is accessible to him only as a correlate of conscious acts. He must thus pay careful attention to what occurs in these acts. This can be done only by a…
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At the beginning of “Being in Time” there’s a front piece, that’s a quote from Plato, from the Sophists, and the stranger, the Xenos is speaking, and he says: “You’ve long been aware of what you mean when you say “being”, but those of us, who thought we knew what it meant, are now perplexed”. In many ways this inaugurates the question of the meaning of being for Heidegger. As we know being has been understood as traditionally sensible and intelligible, real and ideal in many different ways: as essence or definition, substratum, etc.
In Aristotle though being comes to have a particular way of being understood, and it’s traditionally understood as substance. Of course, this also has a number of different meanings. It can be interpreted in different ways. Brentano, for example, has four different understandings of Aristotelian substance: accidental, true, potential and actual or the categories. In all of these being is still understood as substance. The argument, however, is that when it comes to what being itself means, the argument is that being is not for Aristotle to be understood as a genius, being is universal, because everything is – I, you, everything in the world is. Yet being is not to be understood as a genius, and Aristotle has a particular argument for this. Namely, that if being was a genius, then it couldn’t be predicated of its proper diferencia. Why? Because you would then need yet another genius that would encompass both the genius and the differentia. Being for Aristotle is a universal for all beings, but not a generic universal.
So, what is it? Aristotle calls it an arche, an original universal. It’s this definition, this understanding of being that in many ways is the guiding understanding of being from the Greeks to modern philosophy. Many people today in fact still follow this understanding of being.
This history shifts in Kant. When cod comes along in modern philosophy and argues that Aristotle was right – being as a universal, but being is not a real predicate. So, being then is not substance, it’s not the essence. What is it? For Kant it’s not a real predicate, its existence. That’s what being means for Kant. The question then becomes: “Okay, if being is for Aristotle not a genius, but essence or a substance, and for Kant not a predicate, but existence, what is the being of these beings?” This is where Heidegger comes in.
Heidegger argues: “ Yes, Aristotle and Kant are right: being is not a being”. What is it? It’s a universal. Yes, they’re right. What kind of universal? It’s neither essence, nor existence – it’s the universal. Das Transzendenz schlechthin. It’s the transcendental, if you wish. Not as the scholastic’s argued, but the universal transcendence.
What is then the reason why this has never been seen before (as far as I’m concerned)? It’s because the history of philosophy translated Aristotle’s original understanding of being, which he called ousia as “substance”. So we remained in the history of philosophy wedded or loyal to this translation of ousia and couldn’t see that this was actually a mistranslation. The translation should have been “presence”. This is Heidegger’s contribution to the history of being, because he understands that being is presence.
For example, he quotes Goethe: “Over the mountains everything is peaceful – In Gipfel alles ist ruhe”. Everything is peaceful in the mountains s means that peace is in the mountains, peace reigns, peace prevails in the mountains, peace is present in the mountains. That’s what we mean by being.
In other words in the entire history of philosophy for Heidegger being is that which is and also now that which is not. Because being, if it’s understood has presence, can also be understood as absence. And this is the second contribution of Heidegger to the history of philosophy of being. Being is not just present or presence, but also absence or absent. So, being absent is a way of being, not merely a privation. This necessitates a destruction or deconstruction, or destructuring of the history of philosophy for Heidegger. Because it is the understanding of being as presence that has dominated the history of philosophy and stopped philosophy from thinking being also as absent, as absence.
For Heidegger being is not just presence as it was in Aristotle, but presence and absence. Heidegger’s example: if I say of my friend: “He is not here. I miss him very much”. What I mean is that he is not present, but he is absent and yet he is also somehow present, namely present as absent. In this way Heidegger wants to insist that being is determined as presence and absence. So the universality of being that Aristotle originally uncovered is presence and absence in these two ways of being. Tertium non datur or “there is no third”. But what does Aristotle say?
Aristotle says being and unity imply one another. Why? Because being is implied in beings, not only in unity, but in beings: you and I, everything that is. Being is an implication, being means then precisely neither being just present or absent. An example from Heidegger: a hint. When I give a hint about something, it is to be a hint, it must remain a hint. If I explain, if I explicate the meaning of the hint, of what is hinted, it’s no longer a hint. The issue is to remain with the hint as hinting.
Same with implication. If I’m implying something, I’m precisely not bringing what is implied to presence, although nor am I leaving it simply in absence. Implications are then like hints. This means that in the history of philosophy, like Poe’s “Purloined Letter”, the meaning of being as implication has been staring us in the face. It’s been in full view, even though we never saw it. Being means implying, and that is suspending the understanding of being as presence in absence. Thus, being is not implied, because it’s a universal. Being as a universal because it’s implied. This opens up for us now an entirely new area of ontological research, namely, the investigation or the study of being co-implication.
Professor of Philosophy at National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow
1.
Philosophy Topic No.17
Philosophy of Being.
• Categories of being in philosophy.
• Notion of being. Types of being.
• Being as a human being. Phenomenon of non-being.
Being is a philosophic category that fixes the existence and interrelation of the
objects and phenomena. The very first definitions emerged in the Ancient
Greece in the course of setting up of the boundaries of the philosophic
knowledge.
Etymologically it has the reference with the verb “to be” and “exist”.
It means that everything in this world has the status of being. Talking of being
we should not confine ourselves to the fact of being of some loose objects. We
should look into the conditions that do facilitate the existence of the objects of
the surrounding world. Not a single thing stays in this world forever as it gets
to the point of non-being.
Teaching on Being – Ontology is a very significant branch of the
Philosophic Knowledge.
2.
Being is the initial notion related to the starting point of any contemplation on
a human and his world. It gets to the point of being concrete and universal
exclusively through the interactions with such philosophic categories like
matter, consciousness, motion, space, time, system, determinism.
Analyzing this category we come across the two kinds: material on the one
hand and spiritual on the other.
The main forms of Being:
Being of the Objects and Processes. It has two forms.
Materialistic. It provides for the perception of the objective reality the existence
of which is absolutely independent.
Idealistic. Being of the secondary nature, civilization. It has two fold
characters. On the one hand they are made of the body of the nature with
consciousness and soul on the other.
3.
2. Being of a Human.
The interaction of the material and spiritual being gives way to a
subject or a human – a creature with the material base(body) and the
human consciousness capable of the active attitude to life with the idea to
meet the various demands. In other words two kinds of being are fused in
one Human being.
3. Being of Spiritual, Ideal.
Individual, spiritual consciousness of an individual. The structure of
unconsciousness: reflexes, unconscious, intuition.
Spiritual that exists objectively – in other words that has been materialized
in culture.
Social Being.
Being of a human
Being of a human in the society.
4.
The physical, natural world does exist absolutely independent of the
consciousness of the people. The psychic world – the world of the human
consciousness exists as something subjective being dependent on the will and
intentions of the groups of people and individuals. So, the human being is
bound up to be integrity of the objective and subjective. The being of things
created by people is diverse in its uniqueness thanks to such an intermediary
as consciousness. The spiritual world of a human is two fold as subjective and
objective.
There are also different levels of being = being as the potential and being as
the reality. Possibility is not non-being, it has the status of existence, being.
Possibility is the potential being. Reality is the actual being.
Materialism accepts the natural being as the main form of being and
all the rest as derivatives.
The subjective idealism considers the subjective being as the main
form of being. The Objective idealism sees the objective spirit as the source
of being.
5.
Categories of the forms of being.
Single (individual), general and particular.
As of the emergence of the consciousness a human got to the point
self identification he got the capacity of tracing some individual objects with
some specific properties of the objects around his self. Viewing the specific
he moves towards the generalization in the generic sense and figures out the
class of the homogeneous objects. Individuality is the form and way of being.
Watching the individual objects he realizes the ties and possible relations of
the objects. It means that the general is the regulation of the existence of the
individual as the format and room of the individual ones. This generalization
comes through the individual. The existence of the general is due to the
individual ones.
6.
Phenomenon and Essence.
The variety of the individual objects around us is perceived as some
outside reflexes that attract our senses. At the same time these phenomena
keep some steady inner elements that make up the stability of the existing
objects. We call them essence.
We can trace the different approaches and treatment of the interrelation of
phenomenon and essence. Plato thought that the essence is quite immaterial,
everlasting and ideal. Kant saw the obvious difference of the phenomenon and
essence. The phenomenon is the “thing-for-us”, but the inner “nomen” not
achievable for cognition. Hegel has worked out the dialectical link as every
phenomenon has got its essence and the essence is reflected in the
phenomenon.
Contemporary existentialists think that the essence is something to be seen
exclusively under the boundary situation.
7.
Quality and Quantity.
Quality is the combination of the properties of this or that
object. Talking of the quality we mean the particular properties of the
object when it gets in touch with some other objects. In other words it is
the criteria of certainty and the reflection of some definite state. The
other part of this equation is the quantity (extent, weight (gravity),
density). The study of the equation on the quantities caused the
emergence of mathematics. The change of the quantity to a certain
extent does not have the impact on the quality.
Measure and Leap
There is a strict regulation of conformity of the quality to
the respective quantity. This is what we call – measure. The
transition from one quality to the other one is due to the change of the
quantity. It refers to the substance, information or energy. It is universal
and achieved thanks to the Leap.
.
8.
Motion.
Any transition is done through the motion with the relevant format
of space and time. So, motion is the form of existence of the being. There is
no life without motion and never was.
Motion is the source of any change, interaction and
interrelation.
F.Engeles worked out and noted five forms of motion:
Mechanical, physical, chemical, biological and social.
Space and Time.
Space is the location of things or objects while time is the sequence of
events. These two categories are objective and real. It means they do exist
irrespective of the human’s consciousness. Space has three dimensions –
upwards, backwards, sideways. Time has one dimension – from the past to
the future through the present.
9.
Motion and Development.
Talking of the development in the philosophic sense
we the regular outcoming from the inner contraries
irreversible and directed changes.
Any object is developed under the resolution of the
inner contraries. The influence coming in from the outside
can either expedite or slow down the process, but it is not
decisive. Any development is related to motion, but it is not
necessarily that any motion is the development.
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Key Terms in Ontology: Being
«Any linguistic study of the Greek verb be is essentially conditioned, and perhaps ultimately motivated, by the philosophic career of this
word. We know what an extraordinary career it has been. It seems fair to say, with Benveniste, that the systematic development of a concept of Being in Greek
philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, and then in a more mechanical way from the Stoics to Plotinus, relies upon the pre-existing disposition of the
language to make a very general and diversified use of the verb einai. Furthermore, insofar as the notions expressed by on, einai, and
ousia in Greek underlie the doctrines of Being, substance, essence, and existence in Latin, in Arabic, and in modern philosophy from Descartes to
Heidegger and perhaps to Quine, we may say that the usage of the Greek verb be studied here forms the historical basis for the ontological tradition of the
West, as the very term «ontology» suggests.
At the same time it is generally recognized that this wide range of uses for the single verb eimi in Greek reflects a state of
affairs which is «peculiar to Indo-European languages, and by no means a universal situation or a necessary condition.» (1) The present monograph series on
«the verb ‘be’ and its synonyms» shows just how far the languages of the earth may differ from one another in their expression for existence, for predication
with nouns or with adjectives, for locative predication, and so forth. The topic of be can itself scarcely be defined except by reference to Indo-European
verbs representing the root *es-. The question naturally arises whether an historical peculiarity of this kind can be of any fundamental importance for general
linguistics and, even more pressing, whether a concept reflecting the Indo-European use of *es- can be of any general significance in philosophy.» (p. 1)
Notes
(1) Émile Benveniste, «Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue» (1958), in: Problèmes de linguistique générale, (Paris, 1966)
p. 73.
From: Charles H. Kahn, The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek, Dordrecht: Reidel 1973, reprinted Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003 with a new
Introduction).
The concept of being in Western philosophy before Heidegger
«The great intellectual adventure that is Greek philosophy may be regarded, on a somewhat simplistic view, as structured around three basic
questions, occurring historically in the following order: What is the world made of? or What is there?; What should we do?; How can we know? These may
be soon as lying behind what were later distinguished (perhaps first, in a formal way, I,. Plato’s pupil Xenocrates as the three main divisions of Greek
philosophy, physics, ethics, and logic.
I am here concerned only with the first and most basic question, since that constitutes the inquiry about being. Before beginning a
historical survey, it would be well to attempt a definition of the concept with which we are concerned. In the context of Greek thought, then, ‘being» (often
characterized by the additional qualification «real» or «true») denotes sonic single, permanent, unchanging, fundamental reality, to which is habitually
opposed the inconstant flux and variety of visible things. This reality is initially seen simply as a sort of substratum out of which the multiplicity of
appearances may evolve, but progressively there come to be added to it other features, such as absolute unity (or, conversely, infinite multiplicity), eternity
(ultimately timelessness), incorporeality for, conversely, basic corporeality), and rationality (or, conversely, blind necessity). in short, «being»
(on, or ousia) becomes in Greek philosophy the repository of all the concepts that can be thought up to characterize the idealized opposite
of what we see around us — its counterpart, which comprises all aspects of the everyday physical world, being termed «becoming» (genesis).» (p.
51)
From: John Dillon, The Question of Being, in: Jacques Brunschwig, Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd (eds.), Harvard: Harvard University Press
2000 pp. 51-71.
In a first acceptation, the word being is a noun. As such, it signifies either d being (that is, the substance, nature, and essence of
anything existent), or being itself, a property common to all that which can rightly be said to be. In a second acceptation, the same word is the present
participle of the verb ‘to be.’ As a verb, it no longer signifies something that is, nor even existence in general, but rather the very act whereby any given
reality actually is, or exists. Let us call this act a ‘to be,’ in contradistinction to what is commonly called ‘a being.’ It appears at once that, at least to
the mind, the relation of ‘to be’ to ‘being’ is not a reciprocal one. ‘Being’ is conceivable, ‘to be’ is not. We cannot possibly conceive an ‘is’ except as
belonging to some thing that is, or exists. But the reverse is not true. Being is quite conceivable apart from actual existence; so much so that the very first
and the most universal of all the distinctions in the realm of being is that which divides it into two classes, that of the real and that of the possible. Now
what is it to conceive a being as merely possible, if not to conceive it apart from actual existence? A ‘possible’ is a being which has not yet received, or
which has already lost, its own to be. Since being is thinkable apart from actual existence, whereas actual existence is not thinkable apart from being,
philosophers will simply yield to one of the fundamental facilities of the human mind by positing being minus actual existence as the first principle of
metaphysics.» (pp. 2-3)
From: Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Second edition, 1952.
«When the early Greek thinkers initiated philosophical speculation, the very first question they asked themselves was: What stuff is reality
made of? Taken in itself, this question was strikingly indicative of the most fundamental need of the human mind. To understand something is for us to conceive
it as identical in nature with something else that we already know. To know the nature of reality at large is therefore for us to understand that each and
every one of the innumerable things which make up the universe is, at bottom, identical in nature with each and every other thing. Prompted by this unshakable
conviction, unshakable because rooted in the very essence of human understanding, the early Greek thinkers successively attempted to reduce nature in general
to water, then to air, then to fire, until one of them at last hit upon the right answer to the question, by saying that the primary stuff which reality is
made of is being.
The answer was obviously correct, for it is not at once evident that, in the last analysis, air and fire are nothing else than water, or
that, conversely, water itself is nothing else than either air or fire; but it cannot be doubted that, whatever else they may be, water, air and fire have in
common at least this property, that they are. Each of them is a being, and, since the same can be said of everything else, we cannot avoid the conclusion that
being is the only property certainly shared in common by all that which is. Being, then, is the fundamental and ultimate element of reality.
When he made this discovery, Parmenides of Elea at once carried metaphysical speculation to what was always to remain one of its ultimate
limits; but, at the same time, he entangled himself in what still is for us one of the worst metaphysical difficulties. It had been possible for Parmenides’
predecessors to identify nature with water, fire or air, without going to the trouble of defining the meaning of those terms. If I say that everything is
water, everybody will understand what I mean, but if I say that everything is being, I can safely expect to be asked: what is being? For indeed we all know
many beings, but what being itself is, or what it is to be, is an extremely obscure and intricate question. Parmenides could hardly avoid telling us what sort
of reality being itself is. In point of fact, he was bold enough to raise the problem and clear-sighted enough to give it an answer which still deserves to
hold our attention.» (pp. 6-7)
From: Étienne Gilson, Being and some philosophers Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Second edition, 1952.
The concept of being according to Heidegger
«If for us Being is just an empty word and an evanescent meaning, then we must at least try to grasp fully this last remnant of a connection.
So we ask, to begin with: 1. What sort of word is this anyway — Being — as regards its formal character as a word? 2. What does linguistics tell us about the
originary meaning of this word? To put this in scholarly terms, we are asking 1) about the grammar and 2) about the etymology of the word Being.
The grammatical analysis of words is neither exclusively nor primarily concerned with their written or spoken form. It takes these formal
elements as clues to definite directions and differences in direction in the possible meanings of words; these directions dictate how the words can be used
within a sentence or within a larger discursive structure. (…)We can easily see that un the formation of the word Being, the decisive precursor is the
infinitive ‘to be.’ This form of the verb is transformed into a substantive. The character of our word Being, as a word, is determined, accordingly, by three
grammatical forms: verb, infinitive, and substantive. Thus our first task is to understand the meaning of these grammatical forms. Of the three we have named,
verb and substantive are among those that were first recognized at the start of Western grammar and that even today are taken as the fundamental forms of words
and of language in general. And so, with the question about the essence of the substantive and of the verb, we find ourselves in the midst of the question
about the essence of language. For the question of whether the primordial form of the word is the noun (substantive) or the verb coincides with the question of
the originary character of speech and speaking. In turn, this question entails the question of the origin of language. We cannot start by immediately going
into this question. We are forced onto a detour. We will restrict ourselves in what follows to that grammatical form which provides the transitional phase in
the development of the verbal substantive: the infinitive (to go, to come, to fall, to sing, to hope, to be, etc.).
What does «infinitive» mean? This term is an abbreviation of the complete one: modus infinitivus, the mode of unboundedness, of
indeterminateness, regarding the manner in which a verb exercises and indicates the function and direction of its meaning. (…).
Above all we must consider the fact that the definitive differentiation of the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in the Greek form
of onoma and rhema was worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being that has
been definitive for the entire West. This inner bond between these two happenings is accessible to us unimpaired and is carried out in full clarity in Plato’s
Sophist. The terms onoma and rhema were already known before Plato, of course. But at that time, and still in Plato, they were understood as terms denoting the
use of words as a whole. Onoma means the linguistic name as distinguished from the named person or thing, and it also means the speaking of a word, which was
later conceived grammatically as rhema. And rhema in turn means the spoken word, speech; the rhetor is the speaker, the orator, who uses not only verbs but
also onomata in the narrower meaning of the substantive.
The fact that both terms originally governed an equally wide domain is important for our later point that the much-discussed question in
linguistics of whether the noun or the verb represents the primordial form of the word is not a genuine question. This pseudo-question first arose in the
context of a developed grammar rather than from a vision of the essence of language, an essence not yet dissected by grammar.» (pp. 55-60, notes omitted)
From: Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics New translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, New Haven: Yale University
Press 2000.
The history of the verb «Be» in Ancient Greek
«On the other hand, by means of the so-called noun clause the Hebrew language is much better able to express the ‘static’ or ‘that which is’
in its logical sense than the Greek and our modern languages permit with their copula and their verbs of inaction. We shall define the noun clause in agreement
with Gesenius-Kautzsch, in order to be able to understand the ‘being’ expressed in it. Every sentence, the subject as well as the predicate of which is a noun
or noun equivalent is called a noun clause, while in a verbal clause the predicate is a finite verb. This distinction is indispensable for more subtle
understanding of Hebrew syntax (as of Semitics in general) because it is not merely a matter of an external, formal distinction in meaning but of one that goes
to the depths of the language. The noun clause, the predicate of which is a substantive, offers something fixed, not active, in short, a ‘being’; the verbal
clause on the other hand asserts something moving and in flux, an event and an action. The noun clause with a participial predicate can also assert something
moving and in flux, except that here the event and action is fixed as something not active and enduring, as opposed to the verbal clause. For our purpose, it
is not necessary to discuss all the various kinds of noun classes, and in particular not those with participial predicates which should logically be considered
as verbal clauses.» (pp. 35-36, some notes omitted)
Notes
(1) Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm Gesenius (1786-1842) and Emil Friedrich Kautzsch (1841-1910), Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar. Edited and
enlarged by E. Kautzsch Translated and revised from the German 28th edition by Arthur Ernest Cowley. 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910. [Reprinted by
Oxford University Press in 1995].
From: Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, English updated translation by Jules Moreau, Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1960; reprinted by W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. Original edition: Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, Göttingen,
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952 (second revised edition 1954).
«What is the basic fact of ‘being’ for the Israelites will result from the analysis of the verb hayah that follows.
A) The verb hayah: We must devote special attention to this verb not only because it occurs most frequently but also because the
verbal problems discussed above are concentrated in this verb and appear in it in their most difficult form. (…) The most important meanings and uses of our
verb ‘to be’ (and its equivalents in other Indo-European languages) are: (1) to express being or existence; (2) to serve as a copula. Now, as we have shown
above, Hebrew and the other Semitic languages do not need a copula because of the noun clause. As a general rule, therefore, it may be said that hayah
is not used as a copula; real or supposed exceptions to this rule will be cited later. The characteristic mark of hayah, in distinction from our verb
‘to be’, is that it is a true verb with full verbal force. The majority of formal considerations as well as the actual ones lead to this conclusion:
I. The peculiarity of emphasizing the verbal idea by use of the infinitive absolute before finite verbs;
II. the occurrence of the passive form Niph’al;
III. its frequent occurrence in parallel with other verbs whose verbal force is beyond doubt; this is so frequent an occurrence that a few
examples will suffice: Jahveh hurled a great wind, and a mighty tempest was ( Jonah 1.4); God created (made, spoke) and the corresponding thing was ( Gen. 1.3,
9, 11); its parallel use with qûm = ‘be realized’ (Isa. 7.7; 14.24); the messengers of the king command the prophet Micaiah to prophesy safety and
victory, ‘Let thy word be as the word of one of them (i.e. the prophets of good fortune)’, ( I Kings 22.13).
The meaning of hayah is apparently manifold; hayah has thus been considered to some extent a general word which can mean everything possible
and therefore designates nothing characteristic. Closer examination reveals, however, that this is not the case. It is therefore necessary to establish the
many meanings and shades of meaning of hayah and to find their inner connexion. We shall use first the results of Ratschow (1) who has examined the occurrences
of hayah in the Old Testament with a thoroughness hardly to be excelled and in whose work is to be found extensive evidence. He found three principal
meanings: ‘to become’, ‘to be’, and ‘to effect’; but these are related internally and form a unity. In the main this will be right, and it agrees with our
understanding of Hebrew thought; we must object, however, to details.» (pp. 38-39, notes omitted).
Notes
(1) Carl H. Ratschow, Werden und Wirken, Eine Untersuchung des wortes hajah als Beitrag zur Wirklichkeitserfassung des Alten
Testaments («Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft», 70), Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1941.
From: Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, English updated translation by Jules Moreau, Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1960; reprinted by W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. Original edition: Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1952 (second revised edition 1954).
«In modern biblical theology it is commonly held that the Israelites were not interested in ‘existence’ as distinct from active existence,
action or life; and correspondingly that the language has no means of expressing mere existence. The same seems to be the opinion of Boman, who several times
says that a static being is a nothing to the Israelites.
It was mentioned earlier that ‘the verb ‘to be’ as copula or existential was one of the subjects of the questionnaire circulated by Basson
and O’Connor and reported on in their article. On this question they got an answer, and they report as follows: ‘Semitic languages have in general no copula,
but Hebrew and Assyrian both have a special word for «exists» ‘.1 Does this contradict the opinion I have just described?There are at least three linguistic
phenomena which are relevant to the discussion of ‘to be’ in Hebrew:(a) The ordinary type of sentence where the copula ‘is’ is used in English, such as ‘David
is the king’, ‘he is the man’, has no verb as copula in Hebrew. Hebrew uses the nominal sentence, which is a mere juxtaposition of the two elements ‘David’ and
‘the king’. The nominal sentence is a very well-established feature of Semitic syntax. A common addition is the pronoun ‘he’ or ‘she’ introduced after the
subject, giving the sentence ‘David-he-the-king’. Since this pronoun is not indispensable and is indeed very frequently not so inserted, I think it can be
neglected in a discussion of the copula.
(b) The verb hayah ‘to be’. This is discussed at length by Boman, and I shall later make some remarks about his treatment of it. For the
present we have to make clear only the most important fact for the co-ordination of hayah with other terms corresponding to English ‘to be’: it is only at
certain points that this verb coincides in function with ‘to be as copula or existential’. In a very large number of its occurrences it will be well translated
by ‘come to be’ or ‘come to pass’. Or, conversely, English sentences using ‘is’ in the present tense either as copula or as existential will seldom be rendered
into Hebrew with hayah; they will much more normally use the nominal sentence, or the particle yel ‘there is’. We are not on the other hand justified in
removing hayah altogether from the sphere of what is relevant to English ‘is’ and making it equivalent (say) to English ‘become’. For example, a statement like
‘the earth is waste’ will have the nominal sentence, and no verb; but if we put it in the past and say ‘the earth was waste (and is no longer so)’, then the
verb hayah is used, as in Gen. I: 2. It would be quite perverse to insist on the meaning ‘became’ here, and so a certain overlap with ‘be’ has to be observed.
In fact the sense of ‘come to he’ or ‘come to pass’ is not to be explained by going over to ‘become’ as the basic sense, but by noticing that very frequent
uses have an ingressive element which with a verb meaning ‘be’ will lead to a sense roughly of ‘come to be’ or ‘come to pass’.
(c) The word yeš; ‘there is’ and the opposite ‘ayin or ‘en ‘there is not’. This is of course the ‘special word for exists ‘ mentioned in the
report above. Boman in his discussion of ‘being’ does not mention this frequent and important word at all. Moreover, a considerable complication is introduced
into the discussion by this word. Basson and O’Connor (1) are right in saying that it is a ‘special word for ‘exists’, in the sense that it is not normally
used as a copula in sentences like ‘David is the king’. You use it in sentences like ‘There is a dish on the table’ or ‘There is a God in heaven’.
The complication to which I refer is that this word, which we might describe rather vaguely as a particle, is certainly not a verb, has some
of the characteristics of the noun and may be translated ‘being, existence’ in a rather over-literal rendering.
(…)
«Now another point of some importance can be illustrated from this word. The point I wish to make is that the question whether the Israelites
laid any emphasis on ‘mere’ existence as distinct from active existence of some kind is a different one from the question whether their language had words that
could express ‘mere’ existence. The word yeš; can be well translated by ‘there is’, and as in English ‘there is’ we press too far if we try to find in it the
expression of ‘mere’ existence. In fact many cases which use it have also some locality indicated: ‘There is bread in my house’, ‘There is Yahweh in this
place’. This is no doubt the ‘existential’ sense of ‘is’ as against the ‘copula’ type. Nevertheless ‘exists’ would not be a good translation in these
sentences, since we would not normally say ‘Bread exists in my house’ or ‘There exists a dish on the table’. In other words, the ‘existential’ use of the word
‘is’ does not coincide semantically with ‘exists’ and does not raise the problem of ‘mere’ existence, especially when a locality is indicated.»(pp. 58-61, some
notes omitted)
Notes
(1) A. H. Basson, and D. J. O’Connor, «Language and Philosophy: Some Suggestions for an Empirical Approach», Philosophy, XXII (1947)
pp. 49-65.
From: James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
The meaning of «είναι» AND «τὸ ὄν» in Ancient Greek
«BEING. The closest equivalent to the word «being» in ancient Greek is to on, the present participle of einai, to be
(ON, ONTA). The first part of Parmenides’ poem has as its focus esti, the third person singular of einai, and to eon, the
equivalent of to on in Parmenides’ dialect. For Parmenides, «being»(to on) is one, timeless and changeless, and this, he says, is «the
truth»; all talk about plurality and change is «opinion»(doxa), and not the truth about «being.»
Since to on and to onta are, in ordinary Greek, often used as stand-ins for names of one or more individual things, other
Greek philosophers looked for other locutions to talk about «being» in ontologically loaded contexts. One of Plato’s favorite locutions to refer to the forms
(eide) is to ontos on, using the adverb made from the participle to intensify its meaning, literally, «the beingly being,» but typically
translated into English as «the really real.» Ontos was in common use to mean, roughly, «really» or «actually» or «in fact» but combining it with the
participle seems to be Plato’s coinage.
Plato also adopts the abstract noun built on the same participle, ousia, the stem ont — plus the abstract noun ending
— sia. In ordinary Greek, this word must have some of the resonance that «existence» has in ordinary English, but it is most often used, outside of
philosophical contexts, to talk about property or wealth or about important personal characteristics. In English translations of Plato’s dialogues, the word
ousia is sometimes rendered «Reality» and sometimes «being,» while in English translations of Aristotle the word «being» fairly reliably translates
«to on,» and ousia is typically translated «substance» or «entity»(see OUSIA).
Thus, in those of Plato’s dialogues where the forms play a role the distinction between being and becoming is equivalent to the distinction
between forms and phenomena (phainomena), or between Object of knowledge (epistemë) and object of opinion (doxa).
Aristotle does not use the locution to ontos on; apart from his exceedingly widespread use of the word ousia. We may note
the locution to on he on,typically translated «being qua being,» and to on haplos (that which simply is). More generally, Aristotle
frequently talks of the many senses of «being»: in one way, «being» (to einai, the infinitive, or to on) has as many senses as the categories
(i.e., 10), but there is also a distinction between potential and actual being, between essential and accidental, and an equation of being and truth.
The Stoics tend to use the word hyparchein for both existence and predication.» (pp. 67-68)
From: Anthony Preus, Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy, Lanham: Scarecow Press, 2007.
«einai: to be, to exist; to on: that which is, the real; ousia: being, essence. This verb caused great philosophical difficulty to
the Greeks and consequential difficulties for us. Much of the trouble arises from the fact that one can say Platôn esti — Plato exists — or Platôn esti
philosophos — Plato is a philosopher — making use of the same verb, whereas in English ‘Plato is’ is at best an unidiomatic way of saying that he exists. This
double use led some earlier Greek philosophers to think that a sentence beginning Platôn ouk esti… must deny the existence of Plato even if the next word is
barbaros. This leads to translation difficulties for us, as for instance with the sentence ei ti phaneiê hoion hama on to kai mê on, to toiouton metaxu
keisthai tou eilikrinôs ontos kai tou pantôs mê ontos (Plato Rep. 478d), which might be translated either as ‘if something should appear such as both to have
and not to have a certain predicate [we said that] such a thing would lie between being clearly of that sort and not being so at all’ or as ‘if something
should appear such that it simultaneously exists and does not exist [we said that] such a thing would lie between clearly existing and not existing at all’. It
was presumably these difficulties that led Parmenides to say such things as khrê to legein to noein t’eon emmenai esti gar einai, mêden d’ouk estin — that of
which one can speak and think must be: for it is possible for it, but not for nothing, to be (Parmenides in Simplicius, Physics 117.4). In an impersonal use
esti frequently means ‘it is possible’ as in estin adikounta mêpô adikon einai — it is possible to do what is unjust without being an unjust person (Aristotle
N.E. 1134a 17), and in the quotation from Parmenides above. There are also adverbial expressions such as estin hote, sometimes, and estin hôs, in some
ways.».
«on: to on, in the widest sense, is everything that is and, as such, is contrasted with to mê on, that which is not; in a narrower
use to on, sometimes called for clarity to ontôs on, the really real, is unchanging and imperishable and eternal, and is contrasted with the gignomenon that is
changing and perishable. In the dispute between Parmenides and the atomists it is hard to doubt that to mê on as the non-existent is confused with empty space:
oute gar an gnoiês to ge mê on: ou gar anuston — you cannot know that which is not; it is impossible (Parmenides, fr. 2); ouden gar estin ê estai allo parex
tou eontos — nothing other than what is either is or will be (Parmenides, fr. 8). But Simplicius reports Leucippus as saying ouden mallon to on ê to mê on
huparkhein — there is that which is no more than that which is not (Simplicius, Physics 28.12); here to mê on seems to be the kenon, void; cf. the den of
Democritus. In the narrower use, to men pantelôs on pantelôs gnôston — the completely real is completely knowable (Plato Rep. 477a); ei gar panta to onta tou
agathou ephietai, dêlon hoti to prôtôs agathon epekeina esti tôn ontôn — for if everything that is aims at the good, it is clear that the primary good
transcends things that are (Proclus, Elements of Theology 8); to gar houtôs on proteron têi phusei tou gignomenou esti — that which is in this [narrow] way is
prior in its nature to the becoming. (Simplicius, Physics 1337.4).» (pp. 49-50)
From: James Opie Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary London: Duckworth 1990.
«on ónta (pl.): being, beings.
1. The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of Parmenides’ series of logical dichotomies between being and nonbeing (me
on): that which is, cannot not be; that which is not, cannot be, i.e., a denial of passage from being to nonbeing or genesis (q.v.; fr. 2), and its corollary,
a denial of change and motion (fr. 8, lines 26-33, 42-50; for the theological correlatives of this, see nous 2). Secondly, being is one and not many (fr. 8,
lines 22-25) . And finally, the epistemological premiss: only being can be known or named; nonbeing cannot (fr. 3; fr. 8, line 34); see doxa. Being, in short,
is a sphere (fr. 8, lines 42-4g) . Most of the later pre-Socratics denied this latter premiss (cf. stoicheion and atomon), as did Plato for whom the really
real (to ontos on) were the plural eide, and who directed the latter half of the Parmenides (137b-166c) against it.
2. The solution to the nonbeing dilemma (for its epistemological solution, see doxa and heteron) and the key to the analysis of genesis began
with Plato’s positing of space (see hypodoche) in which genesis takes place, and which stands midway between true being and nonbeing (Tim. 52a-c). For Plato,
as for Parmenides, absolute nonbeing is nonsense (Sophist 238c), but there is a relative grade illustrated not only by the Receptacle cited above, but by
sensible things (aistheta) as well (Sophist 240b; Timaeus. 35a, 52c). Among the Platonic hierarchy of Forms, there is aneidos of being; indeed it is one of the
most important Forms that pervade all the rest (Sophist 254b-d; compare this with the peculiar nature of on in Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a) . Further, Plato
distinguishes real beings (ontos onta) from those that have genesis, and in Timaeus 28a he works out an epistemological-ontological correlation: onta are known
by thought (noesis) accompanied by a rational account (logos); generated beings are grasped by opinion (or judgment, see doxa) based on sensation
(aisthesis).
3. Since being is the object of the science of metaphysics (Metaphysics 1031a) Aristotle’s treatment of on is much more elaborate. The first
distinction is between «being qua being» (to on he on), which is the object of metaphysics, and individual beings (onta), which are the objects of the other
sciences. This is the view in Metaphysics 1003a, but Aristotle is not consistent on the point: elsewhere (see Metaphysics 1026a; Physics 192a, 194b; De an.
403b) he states that metaphysics studies being that is separate and unmoving (see theologia). Again, ‘being’ is peculiar in that it is defined not univocally
or generically, but analogously through all the categories (Metaphysics 1003a), and in this it is like ‘one’ (hen) (Metaphysics 1053b ) and ‘good’ (agathon) (
ibid. Nichomachean Ethics I, 1096b ) ; see katholou. There follows a basic distinction (ibid. 1017a-b): something ‘is’ either accidentally, or essentially, or
epistemologically, or in the dichotomy act (energeia) / potency (dynamis). The epistemological ‘being’ (see doxa) is dealt with elsewhere ( see Metaphysics
1027b-1028a, 1051a-1152a), as is potency/act (see Metaphysics Theta passim), so Aristotle here concentrates his attention on what ‘is’ essentially. It is
something that falls within the ten kategoriai (Metaphysics 1017a) and is, primarily, substance (ousia; ibid. 1028a-b). A somewhat different point of view
emerges from Aristotle’s breakdown of the various senses of nonbeing (me on) in Metaphysics 1069b and 1089a: something is not either as a negative proposition,
i.e., a denial of one of the predicates, or as a false proposition, or finally, kata dynamin, i.e., by being something else only potentially but not actually.
It is from this latter that genesis comes about ( see also dynamis, energeia, steresis) .
4. In the Plotinian universe the One (hen) is beyond being (Enneads V, 9, 3; compare Plato’s description of the Good beyond Being in Republic
509b and see hyperousia). The realm of being begins on the level of nous since both being and nous are contained in nous (ibid. V, 5, 2; V, 9, 7). Nonbeing is
treated in much the Platonic and Aristotelian fashion: matter (hyle) that is only a replica (eikon) of being is only quasi-being ( Enneads I, 8, 3). Philo,
with his strongly developed feeling of divine transcendence (see hyperousia), restricts true being to God alone (Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat. 44.,
160), arid introduces into the discussion the metaphysical interpretation of the famous phrase in Exodus 3, 14: ‘I am who am’; see hypodoche, hyle, genesis.»
(pp. 141-142)
From: Francis Edwards Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms. A Historical Lexicon New York: New York University Press, 1967.
«There can be no doubt that Parmenides’ Goddess’s philosophy course is concerned with ‘being.’ But saying this is not saying anything. In
Greek, as in Spanish [or English], ‘to be’ is a verb and, like any verb it can be used as a noun, and then we can speak of ‘being’ (used as a noun). But this
verbal noun is essentially different in Greek than it is in other languages, and so we cannot ignore the problem. This specificity is one of the results of the
flexibility of the Greek language, which permits all kinds of juggling. E. Benveniste wrote that «the linguistic structure of Greek created the predisposition
for the notion ‘to be’ to have a philosophical vocation.» (1) Indeed, the use of the verb ‘to be’ as a noun absolutely does not mean what Philosophers call
‘being’ (the noun). To use an infinitive as a noun in Spanish it must be preceded by an article, in this case ‘el’ [‘the’]. Then the infinitive ‘ser»‘[‘to be’]
becomes ‘el ser’ [‘the being’] used as a noun, in Greek ‘tò eînai.’ However, this formula never figured among the concerns of the Greek philosophers. No Greek
philosopher who inquired into what today we might call ‘the being of things,’ or even ‘certain types of beings,’ including the supreme being, ever asked ‘what
is tò eînai?’ literally ‘what is being?’ As we know, especially since the Aristotelian systemization, the formula used by all Greek philosophers to ask the
question of being is tí esti tò ón (to eon in Parmenides), ‘What is being?’ ‘Tò eon’ is the present participle of the verb to be, used as a noun. The
difficulty of grasping the scope of this neuter present participle (since there is also a masculine and a feminine present participle) has always given rise to
all kinds of misunderstandings, since its use as a noun, represented by the neuter article ‘tó,’ is deceptive, and so Parmenides avoids it whenever he can.
Indeed, just as verbal-noun infinitives always have a dynamic character, something similar occurs with the participle tò on, which as a present participle
means that which is being,’ that which engages in the act of being now. In all that I have said up till now, philosophy is absent: I have only summarized,
perhaps too superficially, what Benveniste calls ‘un fait de langue,»‘ (2) a fact about Greek simply as a language.
It is upon this linguistic fact that Parmenides reflects. In Greek the word for ‘things’ is ónta. Even in current everyday language, things
are ‘beings,’ ‘something(s) that is (are),’ ‘that which is being.’ Philosophy has not yet come into it: that’s the way the Greek language is. But why do we
call something that is a ‘being’? Because the fact of being manifests itself in that which is; if there is that which is, then the fact of being is assumed.
Without the fact of being, there would not be things that are. This sort of platitude will constitute the nucleus of Parmenides’ philosophy. And that is the
reason why his thinking starts from an analysis of the notion of the fact of being, arrived at from the evidence that ‘is’ is occurring. If there is something
undeniable for anyone who is, it is ‘is.’ If Greek syntax allowed the formula, we could say, with R. Regvald, that the basic question would be ‘tí esti ésti,’
‘What is ‘is’?» (pp. 59-60, some notes omitted)
Notes
(1) Emile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, Paris: Gallimard, 1959 p. 73.
(2) ibid. p. 71 note 1.
From: Néstor-Luis Cordero, By Being, It Is. The Thesis of Parmenides Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004.
«It is an understatement to claim that ‘being’ is one of the central concepts of ancient Greek metaphysics. Unfortunately, there is a split
between contemporary commentators as to what is under discussion when being is the topic. On one side are those who think that these discussions are basically
about existence; what exists, the various sorts of existence, what can be inferred from the fact that something exists, etc. On the other side are those who
believe that these discussions are investigations into the nature of predication; of being something or other, the various ways a thing can be what it is, what
can be inferred from the fact that a thing is something or other, etc. Obviously these are two quite different topics. For example, on the existence
interpretation, as I shall call it, one of Parmenides’ main points is that we cannot (meaningfully) speak of what does not exist. His mistake is to think that
words and phrases which purport to refer but which do not refer are meaningless. On the predication approach, Parmenides is correctly pointing out that we
cannot speak about nothing (what is not anything at all) and still be speaking. His mistake is to confuse not being something or other with not being anything
at all. (1) On the existence interpretation, it is perhaps fair to say that Plato’s distinction between real being and a lesser sort is a distinction between
kinds of existence. On the predication approach, it is a distinction between really being this or that and being in a way or qualifiedly this or that. One’s
view of Greek metaphysics is going to be strongly influenced by which approach one takes. A little can be said about the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the two approaches without getting into the details where, as we all know, the devil dwells. In philosophical discussions of being we frequently find the
Greek, ‘èsti’, occurring without a completion. On the predication approach, sentences of the form, ‘x is’, are understood as meaning much the same as, ‘x is
something or other’, in the way that, ‘x sees’, means much the same as, ‘x sees something or other’. Furthermore, ‘x is something or other’, is understood as
different in meaning from, ‘x exists’. For example, Centaurs do not exist but they are mythical creatures, discussed, thought of and sometimes believed in.
Thus, they are something or other though they do not exist. The problem for the predication approach is that there is no unambiguous use of, ‘x is’, to mean,
‘x is something or other’, in ordinary Greek. Such sentences can, however, mean, ‘x exists’. This is a significant point in favor of the existence reading.
This would probably be the end of the story were it not for the fact that in the metaphysical texts in question examples are given or inferences are drawn
which make it clear that predication is in some way involved. For example, in the Theaetetus, 152 a ff., Socrates introduces Protagoras’ relativism as follows:
«Man is the measure of all things — of the things that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not.» Though an existential reading is
perfectly natural, it is all but contradicted by what follows. Socrates illustrates the quoted dictum by pointing out that a wind may be chilly to one person
and not chilly to another, i. e., that a thing may be thus and so to one person and not be that to another. Existence seems not to be in question. The strength
of the predication approach stems from the fact that frequently the philosophical texts in question require us to somehow understand the verb,’ἐστί’, as the
copula.»
«Mohan Matthen, «Greek Ontology and the ‘Is’ of Truth», presents and defends what is perhaps the most detailed and well worked out
existence approach in the literature.(2) After pointing out that Greek philosophers sometimes use the verb, ‘einai’, in such a way that it seems to express
both existence and predication, he presents an interesting account of this phenomenon which allows us to read absolute occurrences of the verb as neither the
copula nor as (con)fused but as meaning simply, ‘exists’. The assimilation of these occurrences to the copula is achieved by arguing that speakers of ancient
Greek were committed to the existence of a type of entity which is unfamiliar to us and which he calls a ‘predicative complex’.(3) These are entities which exist
as long as, and only as long as, a corresponding predicative sentence is true.» (pp. 321-322)
Notes
(1) Richard J. Ketchum «Parmenides on What There Is», Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20/2 (1990), 167-190.
(2) «Greek Ontology and the ‘Is’ of Truth», Phronesis, 28/2 (1983), 113-135.
(3) Matthen sometimes writes as if his thesis is restricted to philosophical Ancient Greek as opposed to Ancient Greek generally. For
example, the task he sets for himself is to explain why Greek Ontologists accepted some principles which he in turn uses to account for the apparent ambiguity
(p. 116). I shall assume here, however, that this thesis is intended to cover Ancient Greek generally. Greek ontologists other than Aristotle were at least
sometimes writing for the general public. If the principles in question were accepted only by the ontologists, the various uses of ‘shat’ would have been as
confusing to the ancient Greek as they are to us. If we restricted the thesis to ontologists, we would also need some explanation as to why the ontologists
assumed principles of which the ordinary Greek was unaware.»
From: Richard J. Ketchum, «Being and Existence in Greek Ontology», Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 80, 1998, pp. 321-332.
From Greek to Latin: Seneca’s Epistle 58
«Today more than ever I understood how impoverished, indeed destitute, our vocabulary is. When we happened to be discussing Plato, a thousand
things came up which needed names but lacked them; but there were some which, though they used to have names, had lost them owing to our fussiness. But who
would tolerate fussiness in the midst of destitution?
(…)
6. You’re asking, ‘What is the point of this introduction? What’s the purpose?’ I won’t hide it from you. I want, if possible, to use the
term ‘essentia’ with your approval; but if that is not possible I will use the term even if it annoys you. I can cite Cicero as an authority for this word, an
abundantly influential one in my view. If you are looking for someone more up-to-date, I can cite Fabianus, who is learned and sophisticated, with a style
polished enough even for our contemporary fussiness. For what will happen, Lucilius [if we don’t allow essentia]? How will [the Greek term] ousia be referred
to, an indispensable thing, by its nature containing the foundation of all things? So I beg you to permit me to use this word. Still, I shall take care to use
the permission you grant very sparingly. Maybe I’ll be content just to have the permission
7. What good will your indulgence do when I can find no way to express in Latin the very notion which provoked my criticism of our language?
Your condemnation of our Roman limitations will be more intense if you find out that there is a one-syllable word for which I cannot find a substitute. What
syllable is this, you ask? To on. You think I am dull-witted — it is obvious that the word can be translated as ‘what is’. But I see a big difference between
the terms. I am forced to replace a noun with a verb. But if I must, I will use ‘what is’
8. Our friend, a very learned person, was saying today that this term has six senses in Plato. I will be able to explain all of them to you,
if I first point out that there is such a thing as a genus and so too a species. But we are now looking for that primary genus on which other species depend
and which is the source of every division and in which all things are included. It will be found if we start to pick things out, one by one, starting in
reverse order. We will thus be brought to the primary [genus].» (pp. 3-4)
From: Seneca, Selected Philosophical Letters, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by Brad Inwood, New York: Oxford
University Press 2007.
Related pages
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Being means the material or immaterial existence of a thing. Anything that exists is being. Anything that partakes in being is also called a “being“, though often this usage is limited to entities that have subjectivity (as in the expression “human being“). The question of being, in philosophy, has been a central topic of metaphysics; the study of “being” is called ontology.
Philosophers often suppose a certain sense of being as primary, and from it derive other senses of being as secondary. So, even if they use the same word “is,” the meaning of being is different, depending upon what it is that “is”: sensible material beings, values and norms, principles, mathematical objects, quality, time, space, God, etc. For Plato the primary kind of being is the immutable world of ideas, while for Aristotle it is the mutable world of substances. In another context, however, Aristotle put one immutable substance, God, as the principle of all being, and Thomas Aquinas, too, conceived God as the primary being, from which all other beings in the world receive their existence. Materialists conceive material or a sensible entity as the primary model of being, while idealists regard thought or spirit as primary. Most philosophers, including Aristotle, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, were aware of these diverse senses of being.
Inquiries into being often contrast it with its reciprocal concept, and the meaning of being varies accordingly. Paired sets include: being and becoming, being and non-being, being and appearance or phenomena, being and existence, being and essence, being and beings, being and thought, and being and ought.
How to approach the question of being is determined by the style of thought, philosophical approach, or methodology. For example, the phenomenological approaches of Husserl and Heidegger locate the question of being on the horizon of human consciousness and existence. Eastern philosophies emphasize the role of “non-being” for our understanding of being.
Many philosophical and religious traditions seem to agree that elucidating the nature of being discloses a fundamental distinction between an essential world and a resultant world of phenomena. They also seem to agree that each of the two worlds has diversity within itself with some kind of purposiveness. Yet they give different answers to the question of which of the two worlds is more real.
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A History of the Notion of Being in the West
The pre-Socratic question of being
The pre-Socratic Greeks had a more direct, non-conceptual, and non-objectifying approach to the question of “being,” as compared with the rather indirect approach of Plato and Aristotle that attempted to conceptualize and objectify “being” through instantiated forms or formed matter.
For the pre-Socratics, the most important question to be answered was: What is the world made of? In answering this question, they were immediately convinced that all things in the world are identical in nature with one another. Hence, they successively attempted to reduce the world in general to water (Thales), then to air (Anaximenes), then to fire (Heraclitus), until Parmenides finally said that the whole world is made of “being” (to on, the present participle of the verb einai, “to be.”) Parmenides’ answer was more persuasive because while it was not at once evident that water, air, and fire are completely identical, it was undeniable that they all have in common the property of being, because they all are. Being, then, was considered to be the fundamental and ultimate element of all that is.
What, then, is “being”? It turned out to be a difficult question to answer indeed. The question of what water, air, or fire is, looked much easier because the definition of any of these was quite self-evident. So, Parmenides did not discuss what being is, but instead highlighted the fact of being as the truth and characterized being as one, all-inclusive, whole, unborn, timeless, immobile, immutable, permanent, and imperishable. His dictum: That which is, is, while that which is not, i.e., “non-being” (to me on), is not: “The one way, assuming that being is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the trustworthy path, for truth attends it. The other, that not-being is and that it necessarily is, I call a wholly incredible course, since thou canst not recognise not-being (for this is impossible), nor couldst thou speak of it.” Thus, any individual things that look mutable and perishable in the world are our illusory perceptions, and they do not belong to the realm of being.
Usually contrasted with Parmenides’ notion of being as the ultimate principle that is immutable and eternal, is Heraclitus’ understanding of fire as the ultimate element of reality, according to which the whole of reality is mutable and transitory like fire. For Heraclitus, everything is in flux and becoming, and immutability or stability is illusory. Perhaps the only sense in which he was able to talk about true being was this unchanging principle of transitory passage and its cyclicality.
Plato and Aristotle
Plato differentiated between the immutable world of ideas or forms and the transitory world, saying that the former is an eternal, incorporeal realm of ideas and values that are true beings, while the latter is a less real, ephemeral, “shadowy” world of material things that are far from true beings and subject to change and decay. This way, Plato struck a compromise between Parmenides’ notion of being and Heraclitus’ theory of becoming, although for Plato the world of ideas is more important than the transitory world. Both are linked through the participation of the latter in the former, and the latter’s degree of reality is determined by how much material things partake and manifest ideas which are true reality. The latter world, while being thus differentiated from the former, is also differentiated from the realm of non-being that is unformed matter; it constitutes an intermediate stage of becoming between being and non-being. Plato treated all this in his Phaedo, Republic, and Statesman.
For Aristotle, the science of “being qua being” (on hēi on) was what he called “first philosophy,” as is discussed in his Metaphysics. but his understanding of being was quite different from Plato’s. For Aristotle, only individual things, called substances, are fully beings, while other things such as quantity, quality, relation, place, and time, called categories, have a derivative kind of being, dependent on individual substances. Thus, all senses of being are derived from a single central notion, the notion of “substance” (ousia, the feminine genetive of to on, which in turn is the present participle of the verb einai, “to be”). According to him, however, whereas each individual substance is a mutable thing composite of two correlative principles: form and matter, or, in more general terms, actuality and potentiality, there is one immutable substance, God, who is pure form devoid of matter. God as the highest genus of substance is therefore the principle of all being and dealt with also in first philosophy.
Medieval philosophers
Main article: Wujud (Finding and wujud)
Medieval philosophy basically followed the Aristotelian understanding of the various senses of being in reality, although the Latin equivalent to the Greek to on is ens (“being”), the present participle of sum (“I am”). Esse (“to be”) is the present infinitive. Another related term is essentia (“essence”), an abstract form of the present participle of esse, referring to what a substance (substantia) is in itself.
One new development in Medieval philosophy was the distinctive notion of existentia (“existence,” from the verb exsistere, which means to “to exist,” “to appear,” or “to emerge”). Greek ontology apparently did not have it, since its primary focus was the matter of predication based on copula sentences of the form “X is Y.” The best Aristotle came up with based on the primarily predicative verb einai was the distinction between hoti esti (“that it is”) and ti esti (“what it is”), which could mean “existence” and “essence,” respectively. Medieval philosophy, however, developed the notion of existence distinctively under the influence of Islamic philosophy, which distinguished existence (wujud) from essence (mahiat) in light of a biblical metaphysics of creation within Islam which differentiated the contingent existence of the created world from the necessary status of God. Thomas Aquinas adopted this, maintaining that the essence and existence of each and every contingent, finite creature are distinct, while essence and existence are identical within God, who is therefore preeminent over the world. Thus, even when rejecting Anselm’s ontological proof for God’s existence that had argued that to know what God is (his essence) is to know that God exists (his existence), Aquinas did not reject the identification of God’s essence and God’s existence.
Interestingly, according to Aquinas, because of his preeminent status over the world, God is now “the first being” (primum ens), and each and every individual creature is a “participated being” (ens per participationem) which derives its being from God as the first being. Thus, although God and creatures are not totally similar, they are at least proportionately similar, i.e., analogical in their relationship through the “analogy of being” (analogia entis). Duns Scotus, however, denied this, suggesting the univocity of being, although he still recognized that God as ens a se (“being from itself”) and creatures as entia ab alio (“beings derived from another”) are two different aspects of being.
Modern philosophers
Empiricists and materialists in modern philosophy such as Thomas Hobbes took a sensible material thing as the model of being and identified sensibility or physicality as the primary sense of being. This perspective of being has been dominant throughout modern times.
At the same time, there were also rationalists and idealists who did not agree with empiricists and materialists. Baruch Spinoza, a rationalist with his pantheistic recognition of only one “substance” (God or Nature, Deus sive Natura), regarded this “substance” (substantia) as the primary sense of being and referred to “mode” (modus) as the derivative sense of being, ontologically and conceptually derivative from the former. For substance is “that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself,” while mode is “the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and conceived through, something other than itself.” Thus, substance and mode are two main senses of being, although Spinoza suggested that being itself has, in the strict sense, no proper definition.
For absolute idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “being” coincides with “thought,” because the subject matter of philosophy is the life of the Absolute Spirit, self-thinking Thought, as manifested panentheistically in the universe. The Absolute Spirit manifests itself in the universe by going out of itself and returning to itself. This life of the Absolute Spirit has three main phases: itself, nature, and the human spirit; and they are dealt with by logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit, respectively. Thus, logic deals with how the Absolute Spirit conceives of itself before the creation of the universe. Logic begins with “being” (Sein), which is the most immediate and indeterminate concept the Absolute Spirit can formulate about itself. But, being is so completely indeterminate that it passes over into “non-being” or “nothing” (Nichts), its negation, which is also completely indeterminate. Non-being also easily moves back to being. So, a third category, “becoming” (Werden), is posited, which is the synthesis, at a higher level, of being as thesis and non-being as antithesis. While being and non-being are wholly indeterminate abstractions, becoming is “the first concrete thought,” thus being able to become “determinate being” (Dasein), which is a definite being. Although notions such as being “in itself” (an sich), being “for itself” (für sich), and being “in and for itself” (an und für sich) are also developed from determinate being, the original dialectic of being, non-being, and becoming is the starting point of the whole dialectic life of the Absolute Spirit that involves all other senses of being through the triads of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis at various phases and sub-phases.
Husserl and Heidegger
In the late nineteenth century, Edmund Husserl recognized that various kinds of being such as normative beings, values, space, time, mathematical objects, logical objects, historical object, and others do exist in different senses. Husserl gained this insight probably from his teacher Franz Brentano who had elaborated it in his On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. Husserl, thus, developed phenomenology as a philosophical methodology which can describe multiple senses of being as the world of the “transcendental ego” or “pure consciousness.” For example, in describing in which sense “time” exists, Husserl inquired into how time presents itself to us and developed a phenomenology of time. Similarly, for all kinds of objects, Husserl inquired into how each of them presents its sense of being to human subjects. Although Husserl did not finish this project, he at least laid the foundation of its philosophical methodology.
Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, took the question of being (ontology) as the primary subject of philosophy. Heidegger complained that the question of being has failed to be answered in the long philosophical tradition in the West because since Plato and Aristotle the notion of being has always been conceptualized and objectified through instantiated forms or formed matter. He, however, appreciated pre-Socratics’ approach to the direct disclosure (aletheia in Greek) of being, and suggested that for this kind of direct disclosure of “being” (Sein), the human being should be thrown to the phenomenal world of “beings” (Seiendes) as Dasein (literally “being-there”). By being confronted with “non-being” (Nichts) there, the human being experiences dread about death (the negation of being) and grasps the meaning of being in beings. His methodology of inquiring into the meaning of being is called hermeneutic phenomenology, resulting from a combination of phenomenology and hermeneutics. In his inquiry into the meaning of being, Heidegger explicated the roles of death and conscience, teleological interdependence of being, and other unique elements. For Heidegger, the word “existence” (Existenz) is simply synonymous with Dasein: “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.”
Existentialists such as Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre inquired into unique modes of being of human beings, and explored complex elements involved in human existence, which includes freedom, authenticity/inauthenticity, anxiety, commitment, death, good and evil, faith, fate, and others. For existentialists, the meaning of being is intertwined with axiological and aesthetic elements.
The Notion of Being in Non-Western Traditions
The Hebrew Bible
The Hebrew equivalent to the English word “to be” is hayah. But, it is hardly used as predicative or as existential. For the predicative purpose, the so-called noun clause is used without copula most likely; and for the existential purpose, the particle yēš (“there is”), which is no longer a verb, is used most likely. Therefore, in most cases the verb hayah means “to come to be” or “to come to pass.” This does not mean that this verb is equivalent to the English verb “to become.” So, for example, “the earth was waste” (Genesis 1:2), where hayahis, the past tense of hayah, is used, actually does not mean to equate “the earth” and “waste,” but to show that “the earth came to be waste,” if not that “the earth became waste.” It is interesting to observe that the Hebrew verb hayah shows an act more dynamic than the English verb “to be.”
Eastern philosophies
Eastern philosophies, while having the notion of “being” like Western thought does, have tended to recognize the notion of “non-being” more than Western thought does. Hinduism distinguishes between being (sat) and non-being (asat), equating the former with the enduring reality of Brahman, the supreme cosmic power, and the latter with the illusory unreality of the manifested universe. Hinduism, however, has another, diametrically opposed use of these terms especially in its mysticism, where non-being (asat) means that boundless and eternal metaphysical expanse of void even beyond Brahman and the universe because of which even being (sat) itself is and endures.
Buddhism accepts the Buddha’s teaching that everything in the world is marked by three main characteristics: 1) “impermanence” (anitya in Sanskrit; anicca in Pali), which not only means that everything will eventually cease to exist, but also that everything is in flux; 2) “unsatisfactoriness” (duhkha in Sanskrit; dukkha in Pali), which means that nothing in the world can bring lasting satisfaction; and 3) “non-self” (anatman in Sanskrit; anatta in Pali), which rejects the Hindu notion of “self” (atman). Mahayana Buddhism extends the third characteristic of “non-self” from sentient beings to all kinds of objects in the world. The three characteristics as a whole, therefore, mean that nothing in the world possesses permanent, essential identity, and also that all things, in that regard, are dependent on each other (pratityasamutpada in Sanskrit, meaning “dependent origination”). For Mahayana Buddhism, this means a virtual rejection of the metaphysical notion of being itself or “own-being” (svabhava in Sanskrit). A doctrine of “emptiness” (sunyata from the Sanskrit adjective sunya, meaning “empty”), therefore, has been developed to show this insight into reality, so we may be led to a realm of wisdom and inner peace where we acquire the Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhatu in Sanskrit).
According to Taoism, Tao (“Way”) is the primordial state of oneness which unites various things in the world that emerge from it. Lao Tzu often referred to the pair of “being” (yu) and “non-being” (wu), saying that both are contained within Tao. Neo-Daoist Wang Bi of the third century C.E., however, identified Tao with non-being and believed it to be the background of the world of being.
Multiple Senses of Being in a Paired Set of Concepts
As has been noticed above, being can often be paired with another concept and the sense of being differs according to what it is paired with. The pairs listed below are some of those often discussed in the history of philosophy. These pairs, however, often overlap and they are not mutually exclusive.
Being and becoming
The Being according to Parmenides is like the mass of a sphere.
Being, when it is contrasted with becoming, means immutability, permanence, or constant. Parmenides considered being to be the first principle of reality, believing that only being is, and that non-being is not. Also, everything is one, and the one is being, which is continuous, all-inclusive, and eternal. For him, becoming is illusory and impossible. By contrast, Heraclitus regarded becoming as the first principle, maintaining that everything is in a state of flux. Plato is considered to have reconciled between being and becoming by integrating the immutable world of ideas and the transitory world of material things through the notion of participation.
Being and non-being
Being means immutable, actual existence, while non-being refers to non-existence, according to Parmenides. However, the contrast between being and non-being has been interpreted in various ways. For Plato, being refers to the immutable world of ideas (forms), while non-being is unformed matter; and these two are united to constitute the transient world of becoming. Hinduism often equates being with the enduring reality of Brahman, and non-being with the illusory unreality of the manifested universe. Mahayana Buddhism denies being in favor of non-being for our enlightenment. For Hegel, being and non-being are two opposing, completely indeterminate logical (and also ontological) categories, which however are integrated into a third category of becoming at a higher and determinate level. For Heidegger, being and non-being are no longer indeterminate categories, and non-being is instrumental for our grasp of the meaning of being.
Being and phenomena
Being, when it is contrasted with phenomena, means true reality in contrast to mere appearances or what appears to sense perception. Plato inquired into the true reality of being in contrast to what appears to our five senses. For Plato, the true reality of being has permanent, immutable ideas, which intellect alone can grasp. Things are beautiful, for example, by virtue of the idea of beauty which is true reality. What appears to our five senses is a less real, ephemeral appearance.
“Be”
Being and existence
- Main article: Being and Existence
Being and existence are related and somewhat overlapping with respect to their meanings. Being means being in general, covering all senses of being, while existence usually represents only one sense of being, which means the actual being of the world of phenomena. In the Middle Ages, under the influence of Islamic philosophy that recognized the contingency of the created world as compared with God the creator, Scholastic philosophy used the Latin word “existere” (“to exist” or “to appear”) as distinct from “esse” (“to be”), and from “essentia” (“essence“), an abstract form of the present participle of “esse.” Hence the distinction of existence from being, and also from essence.
Being (existence) and essence
Being, when it is contrasted with essence, means actual existence, which is one sense of being. Actual existence means that a being exists, while its essence means that which makes what it is. Medieval theologians such as Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas argued that God is a unique being whose essence is its existence, while essence and existence are separable for all beings other than God. The biblical concept of God as “I am who I am” expresses the identity of essence and existence in God.
Being and beings
Being, when it is contrasted with beings, means existence in the sense of event or fact of to-be. Being means the fact of existence itself, while beings mean particular entities that exist. Heidegger, for example, stressed this distinction between being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes) in order to highlight the concept of being or to-be as a dynamic activity. In a different context, Medieval theologians distinguished between God as “being from itself” (ens a se) and particular creatures as “beings derived from another” (entia ab alio).
Being and thought
Being, when it is contrasted with thought, means the objective reality that is outside of the cognitive subject. Thought refers to ideas in the mind; and being refers to spatio-temporal, extra-mental existence. This contrast was used by modern philosophers who had an epistemological concern. The contrast of being and thought appeared within the question of how ideas or thoughts in the mind can be a real representation of the objective reality which exists outside of the mind. For idealists such as Hegel, thought and being are the same.
Is (being) and ought
Being or “is,” when it is contrasted with “ought,” means factuality in contrast to normativeness. Immanuel Kant, for example, distinguished prescriptive statements in morality, which use “ought” or “should” (sollen), in contrast to natural, descriptive statements which describe what things factually “are” (sein).
It is clear that the multiple sense of being has been almost universally recognized both in East and West perhaps with the exception of actualism in analytic philosophy. The distinction between an essential type of world and a phenomenal world is the most basic distinction, and a deity or ultimate being usually belongs to the former. The question of which of the two worlds is more real than the other is answered differently by different philosophical and religious schools, and even when the answer is that the phenomenal world is more real, the real status of a deity or ultimate being is far from questioned (as in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas). The essential type of world is further subdivided into a variety of entities such as Plato’s ideas and Aristotle’s categories. The phenomenal world is also subdivided into various beings ranging from spiritual entities like angels through humans to non-rational beings such as nonhuman animals, plants, and minerals.
There are at least two issues that attract our attention here. First, what sense can we make out of the basic distinction between an essential world and a phenomenal world? Second, what does the existence of various beings in the phenomenal world mean? The first issue seems to show that the world of phenomena is, after all, a manifestation, appearance, expression, unconcealment, creation, or emanation of the essential world that includes a deity or ultimate being. The second issue on various beings in the phenomenal world has often been treated in terms of what is called the “great chain of being” with God as its top, and especially in the West it has usually been taken to mean that a world full of all possible beings is aesthetically more perfect than otherwise, and that God made such a world to show his perfection. Hence, while the first issue shows the act or movement of manifestation, the second one seems to show purposiveness in that act or movement. Pope John Paul II’s call for a renewed “philosophy of being” based on both faith and reason in his 1998 Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio, if from a Catholic perspective, is perhaps a reminder of these points among others.
See also
- Cogito ergo sum
- Meaning of life
- Indian philosophy
- Chinese philosophy
Adapted from New World Encyclopedia
Lecture
12
PHILOSOPHICAL
THEORY OF BEING.
-
The
conception of the world and being in philosophy. Forms of being. -
The
general concept of Matter. Modern science of the unity and
structuredness of matter. -
Attributes
of Matter: Motion, Space and Time. -
Social
space and social time as the forms of man’s being in culture.
The most
important problem for science, philosophy and religion was always to
realize the world, its essence and development. The harshest
discussions on that point took place in the history, as people always
strove for understanding the mystery of their origin and existence.
So the
concept of “the world” embraces the whole infinite and
unreduntant reality (both known and still unknown) in all variety of
things, noumens, systems and processes in their connections and
relations. Or in the other words “the world” is the integral
unity of all existing reality.
Ancient
Greek treated the world as cosmos, meaning “beauty”, “order”,
“universe”. Heraclitus (VI–V centuries BC) wrote: “This
cosmos the same for all, was created neither by gods nor by people,
but it ever was, still continues to be and will remain for ever a
living fire that originates worlds”.
Cosmos was
characterized by its systematic structure and regularity. Alongside
with these properties there are plenty chaotic and contingent
processes in cosmos. These opposites form the integral unity where
they constantly penetrate into each other stimulating the development
of Cosmos.
The concept
of the Universe is very close to the concept of Cosmos, but it
embraces the totality of really existing things. This concept is
referred mostly to the extra-Earthly world while our native Earthly
world is regarded as a part of that infinite Universe.
In science
the Universe is called Meta Galaxy, it consists of a great number of
Galaxies. Meta Galaxy didn’t ever exist. It was formed 10-20
milliard years ago as a result of so-called cosmic explosion.
Treating
this problem on the base of science and philosophy we accept that the
concept of the “whole world” is much broader then Meta Galaxy, as
we never can know everything about the world. It is infinite,
eternal, different in its quality and changeable. Other worlds are
possible to exist, they may have quite different properties, forms
and appearances including such tremendous and fantastic one as the
formation of our Galaxy.
Our
systematic integral knowledge of the Universe, of the processes that
take place in accordance with definite regularity describe the
scientific picture of the world which is not a sum of different
knowledge but the integral gnociological model of understanding the
world at the base of the scientific knowledge achieved by the
definite time.
There were
different models of the picture of the world in the history of
Mankind, that is of geocentricism (after Aristotle and Ptolemy),
heliocentricism (after Copernicus), mechanicism (after Galileo and
Newton), modern –materialistic and dialectical- based on Einstein’s
and Darwin’s theories, genetics anthropology, biophysics,
biochemistry and so on. The contemporary picture of the world
inevitably includes knowledge of man and his place in the world.
In general
in the integral picture of the world scientific knowledge is combined
with philosophical one and the methodology of abstract theoretical
reasoning is worked out. Worldview aspects are also included, not
only man’s cognition of the world but also his relation to the
world are exposed.
The
category of “the world” is a worldview one which is connected
with practical separation of man from nature. His vital activity and
life got more and more dependent on the collective efforts of the
given community aimed at satisfying human individual and collective
needs. It was the process of formation of the definite unity of
individuals not only within the community but also the unity of man
and nature which was involved into the sphere of his practical
activity. That was the prime content and essence of the category of
“the world”- meaning community. The development of the category
of “the world” is inseparably linked with the development of man
himself. The world is the unity of natural and social reality
conditioned and determined by man’s practical activity. It embraces
not only natural, material bases of reality but first of all the
peculiarities of human practical active relation to himself and to
the conditions of his existence.
This
category is a peculiar one in philosophy as it regards reality not
taken separately as it is but in its relationship to man and his
existence. So that “the world” represents first of all the human
world as a real process of man’s living being, as pure human
reality. To understand the relationship of man and the world it is
necessary to pay attention to historical world with a plenty of
social relations which determine the character of man’s relation to
the natural world.
The
universal links in the world are reflected in the category of being.
In
the broadest sense, being is all-embracing reality, the most general
concept of existence, of that which is general. Being is all that
exists: material things, processes, properties, connections and
relations. Even the fruits of the most unbridled fantasy, the
fairy-tales and the myths, even a sick man’s ravings, exist as
realities. It follows that being covers both the material and the
spiritual. It is in fact, something really existing.
There
are different forms of being. Among them we can note as following:
-
being of
things, processes, states of nature (including “the second
nature”); -
man’s
being in the world of things; -
social
being (individual and society being); -
ideal or
spiritual being.
To begin
with we shall regard the concept of outer world being. Here we can
speak of the primary nature and the “second nature”. The primary
nature is objective that is it exists independently of man and his
spirit, which appeared later then nature. Nature is also the sphere
of man’s life and his activity, which would be impossible without
it. All things of the “second nature” are dependent on nature,
they are created on its base and they are included into the concept
of outer world.
The “second
nature” is made by people, as a result of their knowledge and
practical activity, it is directed to satisfaction of man’s needs.
The “second nature” is a peculiar type of reality which includes
both sides — natural and social, historical, that is civilized being.
The primary nature and the “second nature” are inseparable they
add each other and represent the integral world of man.
Another
type of being is man’s being in the world. Actually it is unique.
Man, being a part of nature, is bodily similar to other natural
things. Man is mortal, he is subordinated to the natural laws. But at
the same time man is simultaneously a leaving being who is involved
in the evolutionary process of nature, he is the result of
anthroposociogenesis.
Philosophy
is constantly searching for the integral unity of man’s body and
spirit. Man represents himself by both primary nature and the “second
nature”. His emotions, thoughts are an inseparable part of his
life. To compare with animals man is a practically acting, social
being, who makes things to satisfy his needs. People communicate by
using language. Their soul and spirit are formed just at the base of
communication and practical activity.
The
peculiarity of human being is characterized by the unit of three
dimensions of being. Each man is a sensible and reasonable being
(body); he is an individual being of Homo Sapiens Species, the result
of biological evolution; he is a social-historical being having his
personality. All this determines the specific character of Human
being, his objectivity. Every individual represents himself as a
reality, existing together with his consciousness. People do not
simply exist in the world. They a great deal influence both the world
and themselves, they philosophize on the problem of being, worry for
its future, for their own role in the system of being, they try to be
worth of it.
The last
but not the least form of being is spiritual being. Spiritual
represents all forms of consciousness including knowledge, norms and
principles of communication and behavior (law, moral, artistic
activity etc).
Philosophy
is interested in the way of existence of consciousness, its
development. The problem of self-consciousness is also very important
as it inseparably linked with human Ego.
Being of
individual both conscious, unconscious and subconscious is, though
relatively independent, included into the process of evolution of
being as a whole. Internal and external spiritual being merging they
can penetrate and transform into each other and they can produce
objective spiritual. There are such materialized forms of spiritual,
born in human culture, and then belonging to extra individualized
forms of being. It was language in particular.
The
objectified spiritual being is able to be served, perfected and mixed
in social space and historical time. The loci of objectified
spiritual — is the spiritual sphere of society’s life, its
spiritual culture.
Whatever
forms of being we might consider, they all of them have matter as
their deep-lying foundation or substance. Spiritual reality, too
exist in unity with matter and is defined in the term of it. Matter
and Spirit are the most general categories of philosophy.
Matter is a
basic philosophical concept;
its interpretation determines the approach
to practically all the other philosophical problems. Etymologically,
the term goes back to Latin “material”
meaning
«substance”.
This «substantial»
meaning of the term survived until the 20th century; then
a revolution took place in physics which signified the crisis of the
one-sided interpretation of matter based on obligatory sense
perception,
which was the essence of the concept of metaphysical materialism.
The
unity and diversity of all the forms of manifestation of matter can
only be understood on a historical approach, through generalization
of the experiences of scientific and philosophical knowledge. We
have already pointed out that the first stage in the realization of
the
materiality of the world was spontaneous materialism. The starting
point of the formation of the concept of matter was the transition
from the qualitative diversity of existing things to the concept of
primary
matter—the single
basis of the world embracing all this qualitative
diversity. Further
movement of thought inevitably led to the unification
of all the first principles of being, ultimately resulting in the
idea
of the world’s atomic structure, of which the underlying basis was
the particles, or atoms, inaccessible to the senses.
But
atoms were also interpreted as substance, as the smallest «building
bricks» out of which all that is, is built, the qualitative
diversity
of this building material depending on the various types of
interaction
among them. This marked the birth of the discrete picture of the
world.
Relying on the idea of atomism, Newton
introduced the concept of mass in physics and formulated the
law of universal gravitation and the principal laws of motion.
Atomistic
views underlie the molecular-kinetic theory of heat, and in
chemistry
they played a role in the discovery of the law of conservation
of matter; Mendeleev’s periodic system of the elements was also
created on the basis of atomism.
Newton’s
mechanics, which afforded an explanation of most phenomena
and events in the world on the basis of interaction among atoms,
asserted the mechanistic-atomistic picture of the world and served
as a model of scientific precision for other sciences. Matter in
the form of atoms and motion in vacuum were the two main principles
of Newtonian mechanics. The mechanistic-materialist principle
seemed to be able to explain the essence of all the phenomena
occurring in the world, the finest psychical facts included, and
theoretical
physics, which studied the fundamental properties of atoms, looked
like it might complete its search any time now, assuming a fully
finished form.
However,
along with the triumph of atomism, a crisis was gradually
coming to a head connected above all with the discovery of new
facts which could no longer be adequately explained in terms of the
atomic structure of matter; besides, the atom itself proved to be a
far from simple and not at all the smallest particle of matter. The
electron was discovered, as well as radioactive decay and
transmutability
of atoms. The atom, which was previously seen as «faceless»
and
structureless, proved to possess an extremely complex inner structure
consisting of a nucleus and electrons revolving round it. Still
more critically dangerous to mechanistic materialism were the new
views in the theory of interactions, where the heretofore unknown
interactions within atoms and nuclei had been discovered. This
crisis was connected with the introduction into physics (by Michael
Faraday and James Maxwell) of the new basic concept of field,
which
described a state of matter fundamentally different from substance.
The
field became a really disturbing factor only when it was
conclusively proved that it was not just an attribute of an
object but an independent physical reality capable of existing and
spreading in space regardless of the material object the field thus
became, along with substance, a new and particular form of matter of
which continuity rather than discreteness was the main trait.
Newton’s
classical mechanics stated that such fundamental properties of matter
as mass and volume are absolutely immutable, basic, and not
conditioned by anything. Since mass was regarded as the measure of
the quantity of matter, the discovery of mass inconstancy, its
variability depending on the changes in the field and in body
velocity, was interpreted in the sense that matter had disappeared
and materialism collapsed. The radioactive decay of atoms was
interpreted in the same sense. It was perceived as transformation of
matter into energy, as disappearance — of matter.
Some
physicists (as e.g. Ernst Mach) tended to think that these constructs
were no more than the fruit of pure thought: matter evaporated in the
haze of mathematical constructs, and the constructs themselves turned
out to be self-sufficient essences; the whole reality was thus
reduced to abstract ideal structures. Public opinion turned to
idealism, for materialism was traditionally linked with
mechanistically substantial notion of matter. This situation
urgently required some resolution.
Objectively,
the whole ensemble of new discoveries was dialectical
in character. To
overcome the crisis in physics, theoretical thought had to take a
more flexible approach to facts, in particular to the connection
between matter, motion, space and time.
The
category of matter had to be freed from the allegedly inalienable
links with the concept of substance, and then given a definition that
would reflect its really universal content.
The
path towards a dialectical definition of the concept of matter as the
single substance of the world does not lie through listing its
properties but, as Lenin showed, continuing the materialist tradition
of the French philosophers of the 18th century, in particular
Holbach, through correlating it with consciousness: «Matter is a
philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is
given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and
reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.»
Although Lenin relied on the entire materialist tradition, he
introduced a fundamentally new element in the interpretation of
the essence of matter, stressing that the sole property of
matter with whose recognition dialectical materialism was bound up
was the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside
the mind.
The
antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only
within the bounds of a very limited field — in this case
exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological
problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary.
Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is
indubitable.
Thus
the concept of matter as objective reality is identical with that of
the single substance with all its properties, laws of structure and
functioning, movement and development.
Lenin’s
definition of matter is therefore directed both against objective
idealism (which
posits the spirit as the substance of being) and against subjective
idealism (which
assumes that all objects are mere complexes of our sensations).
Two
basic philosophical positions- materialism and idealism — can be
tentatively identified in the treatment of the issue of the unity of
the world. On one of these approaches, the universal unity of all
world phenomena is believed to lie in their materiality (the line of
Democritus), and on the other, in the common ideal basis of the world
(the line of Plato). Both of these positions are monistic,
for
the basis of the world is seen in one substance only. The former
position is called materialist monism (with dialectical monism as its
highest stage of development), the latter, idealist monism. Apart
from these two varieties of monism, there also exist dualism
and
pluralism,
i.e.
recognition of several equal first principles of the world
irreducible to one another (embodied, e.g., in the ancient
conception of the four first elements — water, earth, air and
fire).
Modem
science on the material unity and diversity of the world. The
dialectical-materialist conception of the material unity of the
world, and of the inexhaustibility of the structure and properties of
matter, was confirmed by the achievements of 20th-century science, of
physics in the first place. The antithesis between continuity and
discreteness, which caused such a stir among the physicists early in
this century, was dialectically expressed in quantum mechanics with
its discovery of such a property of matter as its corpuscular and at
the same time wave structure. This synthetic property is found, e.g.,
in photons, or particles of light; their corpuscular-wave nature was
established owing to the discoveries of Einstein, Bohr and
Schrodinger. The dialectical method of thought in physics manifested
itself strikingly in the fundamental principle of complementarity,
according to which neither a corpuscular nor wave-theory
description of the material properties of the microcosm taken
separately can provide an exhaustive understanding of the facts
known to science, and only their dialectical combination can ensure
the adequacy of scientific propositions. Underlying the formal
antithesis the scientists saw a reflection of essential properties of
the single material substance which was not, however, exhausted even
by these corpuscular-wave notions. Substance is the same in all its
formally antithetic properties: that is now an indubitable fact
confirmed both theoretically and experimentally.
Now,
what is the picture of the world and of its inner unity from the
standpoint of present-day science?
On
the one hand, matter has a «granular», discontinuous
structure: consider the elementary particles, atoms, molecules,
stars and their systems, galaxies, etc. On the other hand, matter is
marked by continuity, found in various kinds of fields —
gravitational, electromagnetic, nuclear, etc. Substances and
fields are the two principal forms of the existence of matter known
to science. A substance is defined as something that has mechanical
mass (rest mass). We can speak here of hierarchically arranged
structures, as it were, from the atom to celestial bodies of any
conceivable size. The atoms themselves have a complex structure:
they consist of elementary particles, the protons and neutrons
that form the nucleus, and of electrons revolving round the
nucleus at fantastic speeds. At present, science already knows a
great many other elementary particles-mesons, hyperons, neutrinos,
etc. They exist both as parts of atoms and in the free plasma state,
as e.g. in the residual cosmic radiations reaching us from the
universe’s past. Science has also discovered antiparticles — the
antipositron and others, having the opposite sign of the electric
charge. Elementary particles, just as photons, have corpuscular-wave
properties: they are both discrete and continuous (being particles
and waves simultaneously), and they have both mass and a definite
electric charge.
In
the form of various substances, matter exists in diverse states. The
most widespread state of matter in the universe is plasma, which
consists of electrically charged particles, electrons and ions that
have not yet formed atomic and molecular bonds. The stars, the
nebulae, interstellar gas are all plasma. The solid, liquid and
gaseous states of matter are extremely rare in the part of the
universe known to science.
The
«continuous» forms of matter include fields, i.e. matter
without rest mass. Fields connect the particles of matter,
enabling them to interact and therefore to exist. Without
gravitational fields nothing would bind atoms within molecules,
electrons and nuclei within atoms, stars within galaxies, and
substance itself in stars. In general, all bodies would have ceased
to exist.
But
the boundary between substance and field must not be regarded as
absolute in the sense that only the same unchangeable fields and the
same constant and immutable particles of substance exist in the
world. This conception would lead to dualism. The deep unity of all
matter in the universe means that the concepts of substance and
field are relative with respect to each other, Their relativity
is not only a dialectical imperative that follows from the principle
of substantial unity of the world: it is also an experimentally
verified and scientifically demonstrable fact. Science has
established that the boundaries between field and substance are
relatively constant only in the macroscopic world accessible to
sense perception. In the realm of microphenomena, these boundaries
are obliterated, as it were, so that substance and field become
mutually convertible. Thus mesons are particles of substance and at
the same time quanta of a definite field.
All
the contradictions in the views of the structure of matter arising
in science are the result of the relativity of our knowledge about
objective reality. Scientific thought keeps completing and then
drawing all over again the picture of the world which appears to us
as an infinite variety of the forms of being of matter and the
properties, connections and laws prevailing in it and resting on
the solid foundation of the substantial unity of the world. Science
moves from one level of the perception of the unity of the world
through the study of the diversity to a new level of understanding
its unity.
The
principle of conservation of matter. One
of the attributes of matter is the fact that it cannot be either
created or destroyed; this is displayed in a set of
natural-scientific laws of conservation of matter in all its
mutations.
The
principle of conservation of matter, just as that of the material
unity of the world, entails, when logically unfolded, two other,
fundamental principles of dialectics —universal connection and
development.
The
principle of the uncreatability and indestructibility of matter is of
great worldview and methodological significance.
The
concept of motion. The unity of matter and motion. Everything
in the world is in continual motion, changing its form, being
transformed, and wavering between being and nonbeing of all
individual existences. Since motion is an essential
attribute of matter, it
is, like matter, uncreatable and indestructible, absolute,
unavoidable, and universal. Matter and motion are of the same
essence.
Motion
is the mode of existence of matter: to
be means to be in motion.
Motion
is not a pure continuum but the unity of continuum and discreteness,
of change and stability, of disturbance and rest. In the endless flux
of ceaseless motion there are always moments of discrete stability,
manifested above all in the conservation of the inner nature of each
given motion in the form of equilibrium of phenomena and their
relatively stable form, i.e. relative rest.
Absolute
rest is impossible, for to attain absolute rest would mean to cease
to exist. Rest is always relative in character: bodies can only be at
rest in relation to some reference system tentatively accepted as
motionless. A body’s motion, Einstein said, is always understood as
its position in relation to another body. Thus the relationship
between continuity and discreteness is handled in philosophy in
terms of the dialectics of motion and rest.
The
concepts of space and time. All
motion assumes a change, interpreted in one way or another, of
position in space, carried out in time, also interpreted in one way
or another. Despite their apparent obviousness, the concepts of space
and time belong among the most complex characteristics of matter. The
most general conception of space and time rests on our immediate
empirical experiences. The concept of space emerges both out of the
characteristics of a separate body, which always has a certain
extension, and out of the different spatial positions of a great
many
coexisting objects. Space
is
now defined as a
form of the existence of matter characterized by such properties
as extension, structuredness, coexistence, and interaction. The
concept of time also emerges both out of the comparison of different
states of one and the same object which inevitably changes its
properties because of the duration of its existence, and from
observation of different objects succeeding one another in the
same place. Time
is
also a
form of the existence of matter; it is characterized by such
properties of alteration and development of systems as duration
and sequential replacement of one state by another. The
concepts of time and space are correlative: the concept of space
reflects the coordination of different objects located outside
one another at one and the same moment of time, while the
concept of time reflects the coordination of objects replacing one
another at one and the same place in space.
What
was the essence of the controversy about these concepts?
Putting
aside the various interpretations of space and time throughout
mankind’s cultural evolution and concentrating on the history of
natural science only, we can single out the two opposite conceptions
—the substantial one and the relative one. According to the former
of these conceptions, which formed in the framework of Newton’s
classical mechanics, absolute space and time exist independently
of matter, and material events and processes proper take place in
these absolutes. Absolute space and time are pure extension and
pure duration in which material objects are placed; they are
immutable and constant. All bodies can be removed from space, and
still space will remain, and it will preserve its properties. The
same applies to time: it flows identically throughout the universe,
and this flow does not depend on anything; time is a continuous world
stream, a constant cosmic scale for the measurement of all concrete
movements.
The
second conception, which arose within the framework of the
dialectical tradition, was clearly formulated in dialectical
materialism and later finally borne out by Einstein’s theory of
relativity (hence the name of the conception) and by the entire
subsequent course of the development of science. The philosophical
meaning of the relative approach is in the conception of space and
time, as forms of the existence of matter rather than as special
entities separate from matter. It follows from this conception
that space and time are, first, objective attributes of matter and,
second, universal in this their capacity. Along with the general
properties of space and time, each of these categories has
qualitatively specific properties. The specific properties of
space are tridimensionality, symmetry and asymmetry, forms and sizes,
location, distances between bodies distribution of substance and
field. The properties of time are unidimensionality, asymmetry,
irreversibility, i.e. constant orientation from the past into
the future, the rhythm of processes, and the velocity of change of
states.
The
philosophical approach to space and time demands that they be
considered in unity with motion and matter.
Einstein’s
theory of relativity confirms the dialectical-materialist principle
of the unity of space and time with matter in motion. The unity of
space, time and motion of matter could be expressed in these
terms: studying matter in various forms of its manifestation, we
inevitably study thereby space and time in their organic connection
with motion; and vice versa, studying the spatio-temporal
parameters,
we inevitably study thereby matter in motion.
Space
and time are conditioned by matter as form is conditioned by its
content, therefore each level of the motion of matter has its own
spatio-temporal structure. Living structures also have specific
features of space and time: their geometry grows complex, and
the rhythms of time change, too.
The
time of historical events also has its own structure, for the
subjects of these events master time and space by organizing these
events and by experiencing them.
There
is also psychological time, associated with its subjective
experiencing. Thus tense expectation lengthens time, while
experiencing pleasure or joy tends to shorten or condense it: time
shrinks, as it were.
Thus
the relativity of space and time, their connection with the
qualitative material content of the structure on which they
essentially depend, has now stepped across the boundaries of
theoretical physics and is used practically in all areas of human
knowledge.
10
Первые и очень важные шаги в этом направлении уже сделаны. Так, уральские философы К. Н. Любутин и Д. В. Пивоваров существенно расширяют гносеологическую трактовку проблемы истины, формулируя ее как вопрос «о соответствии продуктов репрезентативного отражения той сверхчувственной реальности, на которую эти продукты экстраполируются, но которая онтологически может быть описана следующим утверждением: а) коррелят идеального образа существует независимо от носителя этого образа; б) эталонный объект как основа репрезентации причинно или условно-функционально связан с предметной областью, на которую проецируется идеальный образ; в) область экстраполяции идеального образа временно или принципиально недоступна чувственному восприятию» [6, с. 271]. Эти же философы указывают на необходимость «ввести в философский оборот экзистенциальную и креатологическую формулировки проблемы истины» [там же, с. 273].
Это достаточно серьезная задача, и в данной статье будет предпринята попытка частичного ее решения. Необходимо преодолеть односторонность гносеологической формулировки проблемы истины и найти основание для онтологизации этой проблемы. Представляется, что в классической рационализме, где познавательное отношение определяется субъект-объектной схемой познавательного процесса [см.: 5], альтернативная онтологическая формулировка проблемы истины присутствует изначально. Рассмотрим данную философско-теоретическую ситуацию более подробно по отношению к античной философии, философии Древней Греции.
Проблема истины в философии самым тесным образом связана с постановкой и решением проблемы бытия, и это не случайно. С понятия бытия начинается оригинальная философская рефлексия действительности. Бытие — наиболее распространенная категория западного философского словаря. Во всех философских концепциях европейской философии представлено понятие бытия. Оно рассматривается в онтологическом, эстетическом, этическом, аксиологическом, антропологическом и иных аспектах. Существует особое философское учение о бытии — онтология, где бытие предстает в глубинных законах и базовых принципах. Эти принципы характеризуют различные элементы Природы, Культуры, Социума, Человека. И рядом с понятием бытия мы всегда найдем понятие Истины как категорию, выражающую отношение человека к проблеме бытия. В зависимости от того, какие именно элементы мира и человеческого существования признаются бытием, определяется содержание истины.
Бытие как философское понятие содержит в себе и человеческий мир, и мир «без человека», природу как «вещь-в-себе». Понятие истины указывает на возможность познания бытия человеком в двух основных аспектах: 1) возможность познавательности акта; 2) возможность тождества мышления и бытия в том пространстве знания, которое мы полагаем «настоящим». От того, какое содержание наших знаний мы полагаем по-настоящему реальным, зависит и определение истины в том или ином философском учении. Далее будет рассмотрена конкретная связь содержания понятия «бытие» и содержания понятия «истина» в истории философии Древней Греции. Это необходимо, чтобы выявить историческую динамику философского знания на пути к онтологическому повороту, который явственно обозначился почти 100 лет в фундаментальной онтологии Мартина Хайдеггера. Данный анализ также позволит рассмотреть движение понятия истины в контексте культурного пространства западной философии.
В отечественном изучении истории философии существуют различные подходы к определению общего локуса античной философии. А.Ф. Лосев полагал, что главный подход к реальности в античной философии определяется принципом объективизма — как материи, так и мышления. Вещество, ум, душа — эти философские абстракции не несут никакого субъективного содержания в античной философии. В ней нет личностного начала, нет присутствия субъективных смыслов, полагает А. Ф. Лосев. Чувственно-материальный космос, космическая душа, космический ум есть вечные и неизменные космические силы. Понятие субъекта в античной философии также раскрывается через объект, знающий себя как объект. Именно объективистское рассмотрение бытия и обуславливает древнегреческое философское понимание истины.
Начало древнегреческой философии — различение материи и ее формы внутри чувственно-материального космоса. Если ионийская натурфилософия зафиксировала различие материи и формы, то элейская школа, в том числе Парменид, множественность материальных вещей, событий, процессов подчинила единству формы, поставив тем самым проблему истинного ВИДЕНИЯ как ВИДЕНИЯ ЕДИНОГО. Сквозь множественность существования текучих непостоянных конкретных вещей Парменид прозрел Единое. Философской абстракцией, фиксирующей знание Единого, стало у Парменида понятие чистого бытия, которое совпадает с истинным видением этого бытия в мышлении. «Мыслить и быть — одно и то же», это знаменитое изречение Парменида имеет прямое отношение к онтологической истине, так как мыслить — это означает «мыслить-истину».
Одновременно в философии Гераклита возникает и способ описания этого единства бытия и мышления — диалектика — как взаимопереход и взаимообусловленность Единого и Многого. Материя и форма — противоположности, но Космос, в котором они сосуществуют, един. Содержание понятия «бытие» после интеллектуальных открытий Гераклита наполняется смыслом — «быть — это быть единым и многим одновременно». Бытие как единство формы и материи — это не статичное, неподвижное единство, но общее и непрерывное становление формы и материи, текучее и неповторяющееся дважды.
Следующий период античной философии, связанный с практической философской деятельностью софистов и Сократа, характерен тем, что акцент делается на РАЗЛИЧЕНИИ единства и множества. Внутри тождества бытия и мышления специальной аналитике подвергается Разум. Способность разума — это способность обнаружить и указать на тождество бытия и мышления. Можно сказать, что понимание бытия ограничивается у софистов «бытом» — множественными конкретными ситуациями, где истина бытия превращается в выгоду, пользу отдельного человека. Но даже здесь софисты остаются в философии объективизма, поскольку антропологическое измерение бытия связывалось ими не с волей человека, а с непреложными и неизменными космическими законами. Недаром А. Ф. Лосев называл этот период античной философии «дискурсивным».
Значение Сократа для европейской философии состояло в том, что он смог дать положительный импульс для постижения бытия в контексте диалектики идеи и материи. Сократ был убежден и заразил своей убежденностью последующие поколения европейских мыслителей в том, что человеческий разум способен узнать, увидеть объективные формы и идеи, и материи. Материя в античной философии выступает инобытием эйдоса-идеи. Возможность увидеть настоящее содержание идеи — этой способностью, полагает Сократ, обладает человек. Настоящее содержание идеи открывается разумом человека.
Бытие в философии Платона — это бытие объективных и субстанциальных эйдосов. Непревзойденное значение для последующего философского мышления имеет форма сочинений Платона, дух его философии, проникнутый пафосом постоянного диалектического сложного поиска истины и ради самой истины отказывающийся от формулировки последних и окончательных выводов. Окончательные выводы легко убивают многомерность эйдетического бытия. Невозможно остановить то, что бытийствует только как процесс, как бесконечное движение. У идеи нет статики. Она живет в постоянном движении.
Тождество бытия и мышления, понятое Парменидом философски-интуитивно, в философии Платона подкрепляется рациональной необходимостью объединения содержаний категорий материи и идеи. Зрительная видимость Единого бытия расширяется моделированием Единого в рассудочной способности мыслить это единство. Видимость и рассудочность — диалектические противоположности познания — равным образом необходимы для истины. Истина достигается не только интуитивным видением тождества бытия и мышления, но и логически правильным рассуждением. Диалектика рассудочного познания и экстазного вИдения истины представлена в философии Платона как тропа к высшей истине.
Если бытие — это постоянное движение, текучее становление эйдоса-идеи, то что является источником этого вечного становления? Так ставит Платон проблему сверх-бытия, которое «не существует» в обычном смысле, но является нервом, силой любого становления, каждого живого присутствия идеи. Это сверх-бытие трактуется в философии Платона объективистски, в полном соответствии с духом всей античной философии, и именуется Благом. Истина бытия — это стремление текучего бытия к Благу.
Для мышления быть истинным — означает двигаться двумя путями: 1) путем постоянного самосознания, философской рефлексии; 2) путем направления своих мыслей к Благу. Мы обладаем истинным знанием тогда, когда 1) мы знаем, каким конкретным способом мы получили это знание; 2) специальным усилием направили, нацелили свое рассуждение, чтобы увидеть в вещах, событиях, процессах их диалектическое восхождение к благу. Таковы великие интеллектуальные открытия Платона, связывающие бытие и истину в единое целое.
Аристотель — это мыслитель, для которого характерна тщательная логико-смысловая проработка конкретных философских проблем. Именно он фиксирует категориальные различения истины бытия и истинности мышления. Хотя именно в философии Платона впервые истинность мышления стала маркером, индикатором, залогом истинного человеческого существования.
Великой заслугой Аристотеля является описание источника бытия. Его учение об умопостигаемой материи исходит из реального, а не абстрактного тождества единства и множественности, формы и материи. Становление вещи есть становление ее бытия. Это вполне конкретное бытие, эмпирический факт, и в то же время в этом эмпирическом факте проявлены универсальные свойства, общие принципы. Нечто, возникающее в процессе бытийного становления, раскрывает не только себя самого, но и некоторого рода «чтойность». А. Ф. Лосев показывает, что Аристотель понимает бытие как «ставшую чтойность». Идея вещи указывает и на саму конкретную вещь, и на ее обобщенную значимость. Чувственно-материальный космос наполнен эйдетическими смыслами.
Ум-перводвигатель космоса в философии Аристотеля непременно материален (но не в чувственном, а в интеллектуальном смысле), этот Ум мыслит сам себя, оформляя материю самым лучшим, самым совершенным способом из всех возможных. Существует не только физическое становление космоса, но и смысловое, эйдетическое.
Центральным приемом в философии Аристотеля оказывается построение системы философских категорий. Для обоснования правильности выделения этих категорий Аристотель специальным философским рассуждением отделяет истинность знания от истины бытия. Истинность знания — это соответствие становления категорий-смыслов, их подобие физическому становлению вещей и тел, событий и процессов. Так формулируется знаменитое классическое аристотелевское понимание истины как истинности знания.
«Относительно того, что есть бытие само по себе и действительно, нельзя ошибиться, а можно либо мыслить его, либо нет. Относительно его ставится вопрос только о сути, а не о том, такого ли свойства оно или нет… И истина здесь в том, чтобы мыслить это сущее, а ложного здесь нет, как нет и заблуждения, а есть лишь незнание, но незнание, не сходное со слепотой: ведь слепоту можно сравнить с тем, как если бы кто не был наделен мыслительной способностью вообще» [1, с. 250-251].
Для бытия самого по себе проблема истины не стоит ни в одном из его аспектов. Она впервые обнаруживается, когда мышление о бытии в рефлексии и самообращенности внутри самого себя фиксирует «высшие предметы желаний и высшие предметы мысли». Тождественность высших предметов желаний и высших предметов мысли источнику бытия — Благу — и означает, что человеческое бытие через свое мышление является истинным. Достижение истины возможно через усилие мыслить истинно. Можно самоочевидным образом через индикатор Блага определить истинность или ложность своих знаний. Онтологическая истина недостижима без гносеологического процесса, где устанавливается, удостоверяется истинность знаний о человеческом бытии.
Для философской рефлексии, в ходе которой мы обнаружим, истинны наши знания или нет, Аристотель указывает два пути: мысленное представление и чувственное восприятие. Для античной философии бесспорно, что истинное знание возможно лишь в форме мысленного представления, а не в форме чувственного восприятия. Но Аристотель выстраивает более сложное понимание процесса получения истинного знания.
Он полагает, что чистая форма мысленного представления или чистая форма чувственного восприятия не могут быть определены как истинные или ложные. Чувственное восприятие дает знание о постоянно изменяющемся мире, его содержание постоянно меняется. Истинность данных чувственного восприятия постоянно сменяет одна другую. Тогда как мысленное представление возводит свое содержание к единому и универсальному источнику бытия и мышления — Благу. Его содержание не может быть относительным, так как оно описывает неподвижный вечный источник любого движения (как процесса мышления, так и процессуального бытия).
Аристотель противопоставляет истину не заблуждению, а незнанию. Понятно, почему. По отношению к самомышлению космического Ума любой момент этого самомышления оказывается тождественным этому Уму. Так, истина приобретает абсолютный характер — и как истина бытия (всегда имеющего единый источник — Благо), и как истинность знания (в соответствии с тождеством становления категорий и становления чувственной материальности космоса).
Объективизм античной философии неизбежно предопределял такое понимание истины. Диалектика философского познания, которое осуществляется через живое человеческое мышление, не могла не привести к дальнейшему развитию философского понимания истины, когда через диалектическое отрицание акцент переносится с безличностного Космоса, Космического Ума к Божественной Личности, к личностному воплощению принципов истины и блага. Это диалектическое отрицание в понимании истины и произойдет на следующем этапе истории европейской философии в эпоху Средних веков.
Проблема истины решается Фомой Аквинским в соответствии с его пониманием бытия и различением внутри бытия сущности и существования. Любое другое бытие, кроме божественного, различается по сущности и существованию — они не совпадают в нем, «ибо никакое творение не есть свое собственное бытие, но участвует в бытии» [цит. по: 5, с. 372]
Рецензенты:
Викторук Елена Николаевна, доктор философских наук, профессор, зав. кафедрой философии Сибирского государственного технологического университета, г. Красноярск.
Кудашов Вячеслав Иванович, доктор философских наук, профессор, зав. кафедрой философии Сибирского федерального университета, г. Красноярск.