The word signification denotation connotation

Lexical meaning is not
homogeneous either. The plane of content in speech reflects the whole
human consciousness, which comprises not only mental activity but
also emotions. So lexical meaning may be analyzed as including
denotational and connotational components.

The notional content of a word
is expressed by the denotative or denotational meaning
also called referential or extentional meaning.

Denotative meaning
is the interrelation between the sound form of the linguistic sign
and the concept, on the one hand, and the object named, on the other
hand.

To denote, then,
is to serve as linguistic expression for a notion or as a name for an
actually existing object referred to by a word. The term denotatum
or referent means either a notion or an actually
existing individual thing to which reference is made.

Denotative meaning should be
distinguished from significative meaning. Significative meaning
is the interrelation between the sound form of the linguistic sign
(phonetic word) with the concept of the object it denotes.

1.3.5. Connotative meaning

The emotional content of the
word is its capacity to evoke or directly express emotions. It is
rendered by the emotional or expressive counterpart of meaning, also
called emotive charge< intentional or affective connotations of
words.

Connotative or
connotational meaning is termed as part of lexical meaning
expressing the emotive charge and stylistic value of a linguistic
unit.

The emotive charge
is one of the objective semantic features proper to words as
linguistic units and forms part of the connotational component of
meaning. Let us compare the following words: like, love, cherish,
adore, worship. We cannot fail to observe the difference in the
emotive charge of the members of this set of synonyms. The emotive
charge of the words adore and worship is much heavier
than that of the words like and love.

The emotive charge should not
be confused with emotive implications that words may acquire in
speech. The emotive implication of the word is to a great extent
subjective as it depends on the personal experience of the speaker,
on the mental imagery the evokes in him. Words seemingly devoid of
any emotional element may possess strong emotive implications in the
case of certain individual speakers.

The meaning of many words is
subject to complex associations originating in habitual contexts,
verbal or situational, of which the speaker and the listener are
aware, and which form the connotational component of meaning.

In some words the realization
of meaning is accompanied by additional stylistic features revealing
the speaker’s attitude to the situation, the subject-matter, and to
his interlocutor.

1.3.6. Emotive charge and sociostylistic reference of words

Words differ not only in their
emotive charge but also in their sociostylistic reference.
In the sociostylistic plane according to the sociolinguistic norm
words can be subdivided into two complex groups of vocabulary layers:
the literary standard vocabulary and non-standard or substandard
vocabulary.

The literary standard
vocabulary, in its turn, includes three stylistic layers of words –
literary or bookish words, neutral
words and literary colloquial words.

Let us compare, for example,
the following set of synonyms which are almost identical in their
denotational meaning: countenance, face, phiz (cf. their
Russian counterparts: лик,
лицо, физия).
The word countenance belongs to the bookish
or poetic layer of vocabulary. The word
face belongs to the neutral layer of
vocabulary. And the word phiz belongs to the literary
colloquial layer of vocabulary.

Against the neural layer of
vocabulary we can distinguish words belonging to higher and lower
layers of vocabulary. Here, in comparison with the word face,
which is stylistically neutral, the word countenance is felt
as bookish and the word phiz stands out as jocular colloquial.

The non-standard vocabulary,
in its turn, comprises five sociostylistic layers of words – low
colloquialisms, general slang, professional
and corporative jargons, argot or cant
and vulgarisms.

Let us enlarge further the
above given set of synonyms: countenance, face, phiz, map, mug,
pan, biscuit, clock, dial, gills, squash (cf. their Russian
counterparts: морда, рожа,
рыло, харя,
мурло). All of them belong to, slang,
jargons, argot and some of them may be
considered even vulgar.

The stylistic reference of
bookish, colloquial, slang words, jargonisms and vulgarisms is
clearly observed when we compare them with their neutral synonyms.

Stylistic reference and
emotive charge of words are closely connected and to a certain degree
interdependent. As a rule stylistically coloured words, that is words
belonging to all stylistic layers except the neutral one, are
observed to possess a considerable emotive charge. This can be proved
by comparing stylistically labelled words with their neutral
synonyms.

The poetic word countenance
and the literary colloquial word phiz carry heavier emotive
charges than their neutral counterpart face; but the low
colloquialisms and slangy words map, mug, pan, biscuit, clock,
dial, not mentioning gills, squash, are still by far more
expressive even than phiz. Here we see that words of low
stylistic styles differ in the degree of their emotive charge.

However, words of neutral
style may also differ in the degree of their emotive charge. Compare,
for example, the words large, tremendous, enormous; though
equally neutral as to their stylistic reference, they are not
identical as far as their emotive charge is concerned.

So in conclusion, connotative
meaning may be defined as emotional, expressive and stylistic
coloring of the word as an additional component to its denotative and
significative meanings within its lexical meaning.

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Asked by: Carmine Luettgen

Score: 4.8/5
(7 votes)

DENOTATION: The direct definition of the word that you find in the dictionary. CONNOTATION: The emotional suggestions of a word, that is not literal.

What are connotative and denotative examples?

What is the connotative meaning?

1a : something suggested by a word or thing : implication the connotations of comfort that surrounded that old chair. b : the suggesting of a meaning by a word apart from the thing it explicitly names or describes. 2 : the signification of something …

What is the meaning of Denotative meaning?

1 : an act or process of denoting. 2 : meaning especially : a direct specific meaning as distinct from an implied or associated idea comparing a word’s denotation with its connotations In fact, the «Parks and Recreation» alum said he didn’t know the word’s medical denotation. — Nardine Saad. 3a : a denoting term : name.

What is an example of connotative?

Connotation is the use of a word to suggest a different association than its literal meaning, which is known as denotation. For example, blue is a color, but it is also a word used to describe a feeling of sadness, as in: “She’s feeling blue.” Connotations can be either positive, negative, or neutral.

44 related questions found

Author: Bill Schnupp

Abstract: Elements of Semiology: Intro., Signifier and Signified, Denotation and Connotation.

I. Summary

A. Introduction

In this section, Barthes introduces readers to semiology, tempering his definition with the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure to characterize the as yet undeveloped discipline as “a science of signs. . .[and] systems of signification” (9). These systems can encompass objects, music, public entertainment, and myriad other possibilities.

Barthes stresses that at the time he is writing, semiology is a very underdeveloped area of study, “a tentative science.” In this science, no system can signify autonomously—language must, at some level, be present. In this sense semiology is a sub-discipline of linguistics: “it is semiology which is a part of linguistics. . .it is that part covering the great signifying unities of discourse” (11). Barthes closes by highlighting the four divisions of semiology he perceives and later discusses: Language and Speech, Signified and Signifier, Syntagm and System, and Denotation and Connotation.

B. Signifier and Signified

Perhaps the first thing that should be said about this section is that it is a continual parallel between linguistics and semiology, as the latter was, at this time, a rather raw and undeveloped mode of inquiry. Barthes draws continually on linguistics as the forbearer of semiology to inform his discussion in places where semiological thought is not yet fully articulated.

Barthes opens this section with the concept of the sign, a signifying relationship (or meaning, as I read it) which is essentially the union of the components signifier (a term) and the signified (its concept or relation.) Ideas of content and expression are inextricable from this process.

signifier+signified=sign

At the same time, readers are reminded that the sign is more complex than this basic formula: indeed, it is more than “the mere correlation of a signifier and a signified, but perhaps more essentially an act of simultaneously cutting out two amorphous masses” (56). Every element in the semiological relationship has more than one meaning. Like a sheaf of paper, each possesses a reverse image. Signs, particularly those with utilitarian, functional origins, are known as sign-functions. The idea I draw from this from this is that reality and meaning are based on use and function: “there is no reality except when it is intelligible” (42).

The signified in the relationship Barthes imposes is defined as “the mental representation of a thing. . .a concept” (42-3). It incorporates such elements as practices, techniques, and ideologies. It is this component of the triadic relationship which triggers Barthes’ discussion of metalanguages (languages about languages—that is, a discourse employed to make sense of another discourse.)

The signifier is a mediator to handle the words, images, and objects in the sign equation. It is the initial element triggers the process of investing meaning and thus making a sign. The union of the signifier and signified is termed signification. This process of making meaning is, according to Barthes’ interpretation of Saussure, arbitrary, a product of social convention. The sign can be interpreted as the value of the expression, and is a product of exchange and comparison among dissimilar words and ideas. Barthes closes with an estimate of where he believes semiology is headed: toward existence as a discipline concerned with the production of reality, fused with taxonomy—termed arthrology, a science of apportionment.

C. Denotation and Connotation

In this discussion, Barthes revisits the relationship between signifier, signified and sign. However, in this section, the relation is approached in a new way, in the relation (R) between expression (E) and content (C), expressed as ERC. The focus here is on staggered systems of signification, or those systems in which one or more of the components in the relation (ERC) is expressed by a relation all its own.

Ex. (ERC) RC, where E=(ERC). The first system lies in the plane of denotation, and the second (collective), in the plane of connotation; it is wider and encompasses all the elements. The way I read this (and if I’m wrong somebody please correct me), denotation stands for the collectively agreed upon meaning of an image or text—comparable to the signifier— and connotation represents the accompanying ideas and concepts—much like the signified and the ensuing process of signification.

Barthes uses the discussion of denotation and connotation to branch off and further explore metalanguages, those discourses employed to speak about and analyze discourses. In this model, a language (in the linguistic sense) is a first-order language, and the ensuing metalanguage is a second-order language. The role of the semiologist, then, is to decipher the first-order language through the lens of the second, but in doing so there is a danger: just as connotation served as an extension of denotation in the system above, so too can each subsequent metalanguage serve as a segue into another and another, a self-sustaining and destructive cycle. As each language rises, another takes its place, “a diachrony of metalanguages, and each science, including of course semiology, would contain the seeds of its own death, in the shape of the language destined to speak it» (93).

II. Analysis

I’ll start by saying that a great deal of this was tough to grasp the first time around. I’ve tried to bring out some of the main ideas (or what I perceived as the main ideas) in this section.

Clearly, the roots of Semiology stem from linguistics—“there is no meaning which is not designated, and the world of signifieds is none other than that of language” (Barthes 10)—but for me the two diverge in their scope: linguistics is dedicated solely to the study of languages and the various forms and processes encompassed therein; semiology, on the other hand, is devoted not only to the verbal, but to all other means of making meaning that intersect the verbal realm. In some additional reading, I even found that there are branches of semiotics that study animal behavior (zoosemiotics), human body language (kinsemics and proxemics), and one variety that examines communication by olfactory signs. Semiology seems a literal embodiment of the connotation Barthes is so enamored of (there is more to meaning than meets the eye; it goes beyond language to engage the public and the personal to include things like music, gestures objects, events, etc.)

It is not difficult to perceive how the ideas of Barthes tie in with the ideas we have encountered in class to this point. Semiology is concerned with the interpretation of various cultural texts, and though the discipline is clearly very structuralist, I’m not sure it falls entirely under that paradigm. The meaning that arises from the triadic relationship between signifier/signified/sign is essentially arbitrary, an idea Barthes touches on—“the only link between signifier and signified, is a fairly arbitrary (although inevitable) abstraction” (54). This suggests that the meaning someone invests in a sign is largely socially dictated—a word means something because we collectively allow it to do so. Thus, our experience is dictated by the pre-approved structure. A good example can be found in Daniel Chandler’s discussion of semiotics, in which he gives the example of an open sign in a shop window. In this scenario, a passerby would likely invest meaning in the following way: the signifier, the word ‘open,’ is mentally combined with the accompanying signified concept that the shop is open for business, and these two combine to form the resulting sign, a shop with an ‘open’ sign in the window is prepared to exchange with consumers.

?My question here concerns the different meanings people may construct. Say someone outside is wearing a sweater. When I see this, I would see the signifier, sweater, combined with the signified concept that it is cold outside, and the sign, that someone is wearing a long-sleeved, heavily woven garment because it is cold outside. Perhaps, though, it isn’t cold. Maybe it’s a hot July day and the person wears the sweater because their office air-conditioner is too efficient. Maybe the sweater was a gift from a loved one no longer living and the wearer dons the sweater for sentimental reasons. Maybe the wearer’s friend made a bet that the wearer couldn’t go an entire July day wearing a wool sweater. There could be many variations in this story. My point is simply this: many of the myriad meanings for the wearing of the sweater are not socially configured; as such, personal experience seems to motivate the wearing of the sweater, and thus experience here is no effect, but a driving force. Isn’t this culturalist influence?

?I’m also still working on the idea of the metalanguage and its destructive potential. The way I read it, a metalangauge is a discourse used to discuss another discourse and is thereby its destroyer (for example, myth is a metalanguage for the language in which the myth originates.) So, couldn’t, say, cultural studies be considered a metalanguage because it ‘s used as a means to interpret cultural texts? If this is the case, then isn’t the discipline simultaneously studying and destroying its object of inquiry?

Barthes ideas, though at times a bit difficult, nonetheless fascinate me. By-and-large, his work seems motivated by the relationship between language (and other modes of signification) and thought, and how the two combine to make meaning. It unites questions of culture, psychology, reality, and many others.

III. Questions and Further Reading.

1. For you, does semiology seem more aligned with structuralism or culturalism?

2. After reading Barthes, what do you make of this statement: the limits of my language are the limits of my
world?

3. How do you respond to Barthes’ idea of the destructive cycle of metalanguages?

It always helps me to have other readings to draw on. I found some very accessible readings online at:

http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/french/as-sa/index.html
http://www.percepp.com/semiosis.htm