Believing what you want to believe word

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О, я тороплюсь ни за что.

О, я ушел и поздоровался.

О, я не могу позволить себе билет,

О, я слишком поздно для шоу.

О, я покидаю эмиграцию.

О, должно быть, я в курсе.

Куда же я иду,

Когда весь лед разбился?

Я устал от того, что залег на дно.

Так Разбуди меня, когда я проснусь.

О, я прошел точку, показывающую,

О, я действительно должен уйти,

Я просто хочу услышать ложь

По своему желанию, увидеть, поверить.

Я не хочу верить в то, во что я хочу верить,

О, я готовлюсь покинуть этот момент.

О, я безрассуден сам по себе.

О, я скрываю это понимание.

О, Я ненавижу статуску,

Когда пытаюсь жить.

Кажется, как будто я все это придумал,

И предложения помогут,

Коллекции будут заняты.

О, я не жду конца.

О, я знаю, это было давно,

Я просто хочу слышать ложь

По своему желанию, видеть, верить.

Я не хочу верить в то, во что хочу верить.

Верь!

by Solid Mantis October 6, 2020

I want to believe you, but the fact is, the Mutts spared you.
Я хочу верить тебе, но дело в том что дворняги пощадили тебя.

If I want to believe she’s a bird that perches on our window sill, or a butterfly that sits on my shoulder or a bloody frog that.
Если я хочу верить в то, что она птичка, которая присела на наш подоконник, Или бабочка, которая прилетела на мое плечо Или лягушка, которая.

I want to believe you, but people make this claim all the time.
Я хочу вам верить, но люди заявляют подобное постоянно.

I want to believe, and you do too.
Я хочу верить. И Вы, конечно, тоже.

Let me stipulate that I have no proof that Romney is a unicorn, and indeed I want to believe that he is not.
Хочу заметить, что у меня нет данных, доказывающих, что Ромни — единорог. Более того, я хотел бы верить, что это — неправда.

As the backlash intensified, he deleted his Facebook account and wrote on the Russian social network Vkontakte that he might end his movie career in order to avoid misleading «those who really want to believe it’s possible to change something.»
Когда негативная реакция на фильм усилилась, Быков удалил свой аккаунт в Facebook и написал в российской социальной сети «ВКонтакте», что он может завершить кинематографическую карьеру, дабы не вводить в заблуждение тех, кто на самом деле хочет верить в возможность что-то изменить.

I want to live in Australia.
Я хочу жить в Австралии.

Russians certainly welcomed the annexation of Crimea, and TV propaganda on the war in Ukraine is effective in part because it reflects what viewers want to believe: They share with Putin a sense of victimhood and national hurt that they want to redress.
Россияне, конечно же, с радостью восприняли аннексию Крыма, а телепропаганда войны на Украине является эффективной отчасти потому, что отражает то, во что россияне хотят верить: они, как и Путин, чувствуют себя жертвой и испытывают чувство национальной обиды, которое хотели бы компенсировать.

I want to eat apple pie.
Я хочу есть яблочный пирог.

But with nearly a decade having passed, with all that has been brought to light about the war-makers’ sales campaign, and with all the costs and agonies of the Iraq War itself (and even allowing for some dissonance-reduction along those who supported the war and want to believe they did so for a good reason), these poll results are still remarkable.
Но ведь прошло целое десятилетие, появилась масса разоблачений об этой кампании воинствующих рекламодателей, мы узнали многое о той цене, которую пришлось заплатить за иракскую войну, и о принесенных жертвах (даже сторонники войны, которые хотят верить, что делали это небезосновательно, и те начали потихоньку прозревать). Поэтому результаты опросов по-прежнему поражают.

I want to know the reason.
Я хочу знать причину.

These statistics show that people in the east desperately want to believe that the Ukrainian government is capable of offering them a brighter future.
Эта статистика показывает, что люди на востоке отчаянно хотят верить в способность украинского правительства дать им более светлое будущее.

I want to eat some cake first.
Сперва я хочу съесть немного пирога.

A comforting thought — if you still want to believe in financial sanity — is that this was a case of a «perfect storm,» a rare failure that required a large number of stars to be in alignment simultaneously.
Утешением может послужить мысль — при желании всё еще верить в финансовую вменяемость — что это было примером «идеального шторма», редкого неблагоприятного стечения обстоятельств, сочетания множества несчастливых звёзд.

I want to eat a Dapanji!
Я хочу поесть острую курицу в большой тарелке!

«Yes, but we want to believe that there is a Japanese people.»
«Да, но мы хотим верить, что есть японский народ».

I want to go to America some day.
Я хочу однажды поехать в Америку.

People want to believe that the boom will continue, and that their investments in their favorite city are thus special and exciting.
Людям хочется верить в то, что бум будет продолжаться, и что их инвестиции в свой любимый город являются, поэтому, чем-то особенным и замечательным.

I want to go abroad, for instance, to Italy and Spain.
Я хочу уехать за границу, например в Италию или Испанию.

You want to believe I took money from drug raids, that’s fine.
Если хочешь верить в то, что я брал деньги во время рейдов, хорошо.

Fact or opinion?

It’s a distinction we learn as kids. But it turns out judging facts isn’t nearly as black-and-white as your third-grade teacher might have had you believe.

In reality, we rely on a biased set of cognitive processes to arrive at a given conclusion or belief. This natural tendency to cherry pick and twist the facts to fit with our existing beliefs is known as motivated reasoning—and we all do it.

«Motivated reasoning is a pervasive tendency of human cognition,» says Peter Ditto, PhD, a social psychologist at the University of California, Irvine, who studies how motivation, emotion and intuition influence judgment. «People are capable of being thoughtful and rational, but our wishes, hopes, fears and motivations often tip the scales to make us more likely to accept something as true if it supports what we want to believe.»

In today’s era of polarized politics—and when facts themselves are under attack—understanding this inclination (and finding ways to sidestep it) has taken on new urgency, psychologists say.

Red facts and blue facts

Much of the early research on motivated reasoning showed that people weigh facts differently when those facts are personally threatening. More than two decades ago, Ditto and David F. Lopez, PhD, compared study participants who received either favorable or unfavorable medical tests results. People who were told they’d tested positive for a (fictitious) enzyme linked to pancreatic disorders were more likely to rate the test as less accurate, cite more explanations to discount the results and request a second opinion (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1992).

«It takes more information to make you believe something you don’t want to believe than something you do,» Ditto says.

We don’t just delude ourselves when it comes to our health and well-being. Research shows we also interpret facts differently if they challenge our personal beliefs, group identity or moral values. «In modern media terms, that might mean a person is quick to share a political article on social media if it supports their beliefs, but is more likely to fact-check the story if it doesn’t,» Ditto says.

For instance, Ditto and his former student Brittany Liu, PhD, have shown the link between people’s moral convictions and their assessment of facts. They found people who were morally opposed to condom education, for example, were less likely to believe that condoms were effective at preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Similarly, people who had moral qualms about capital punishment were less likely to believe it was an effective way to deter crime (Social Psychology and Personality Science, 2012). «People blur the line between moral and factual judgments,» Ditto explains.

For people who identify strongly with one side of the political spectrum or the other, it can feel like their opponents are willfully ignoring the facts. But right or left, both sides believe their positions are grounded in evidence, Ditto says. «We now live in a world where there are red facts and blue facts, and I believe these biased motivated-reasoning processes fuel political conflict. If someone firmly believes some fact to be true that you just as firmly believe to be false, it is hard for either of you not to see that other person as stupid, disingenuous or both.»

In an analysis presented at the 2015 annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, he and colleagues examined 41 experimental studies of partisan bias involving more than 12,000 participants. They found that self-identified conservatives and liberals both showed a robust partisan bias when evaluating empirical evidence, to an almost identical degree. «It’s an equal-opportunity bias,» he says.

That bias is unsurprising given the powerful social incentives for group-think, says Daniel Kahan, JD, a professor of law and psychology at Yale Law School who studies risk perception, science communication and the application of decision science to law and policymaking. Consider climate change. Discounting the evidence of human-caused global warming has become a central feature of the conservative platform—and taking an opposing viewpoint could damage your reputation within that group.

«If you take an ordinary member of the public, his or her carbon footprint is too small to make an effect on climate change. If they make a mistake on the science in that part of their life, nothing bad happens to them,» Kahan explains. «But they can be adversely affected if they’re holding a deviant view on an identity-defining issue inside their social group.»

So, consciously or not, people may twist the facts. They can even trick themselves into believing that the facts aren’t relevant, as social psychologist Troy Campbell, PhD, an assistant professor of marketing at the University of Oregon, and colleagues have shown.

His team presented volunteers who either supported or opposed same-sex marriage with alleged «facts» suggesting children raised by same-sex parents did or did not experience negative outcomes. When the evidence was on their side, participants stated their opinions on the matter were based in fact. But when the evidence opposed their view, they argued the question wasn’t about facts, but morals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2015). «People take flight from facts,» Campbell says.

The more you know

People often dismiss those who hold opposing views as idiots (or worse). Yet highly educated people are just as likely to make biased judgments—and they might actually do it more often.

In one example of this «expertise paradox,» Kahan and colleagues asked volunteers to analyze a small data set. First, they showed data that purportedly demonstrated the effectiveness of a cream for treating skin rash. Unsurprisingly, people who had a greater ability to use quantitative information did better at analyzing the data.

But there was a twist. When participants saw the very same numbers, but were told they came from a study of a gun-control ban, their political views affected how accurately they interpreted the results. And those who were more quantitatively skilled actually showed the most polarized responses. In other words, expertise magnified the tendency to engage in politically motivated reasoning (Behavioural Public Policy, in press). «As people become more proficient in critical reasoning, they become more vehement about the alignment of the facts with their group’s position,» Kahan says.

The pattern holds up outside the lab as well. In a national survey, Kahan and colleagues found that overall, people who were more scientifically literate were slightly less likely to see climate change as a serious threat. And the more they knew, the more polarized they were: Conservatives became more dismissive of climate change evidence, and liberals became more concerned about the evidence, as science literacy and quantitative skills increased (Nature Climate Change, 2012).

«It’s almost as though the sophisticated approach to science gives people more tools to curate their own sense of reality,» says Matthew Hornsey, PhD, a professor of psychology at the University of Queensland who studies the processes that influence people to accept or reject scientific messages.

Unfortunately, our modern media landscape seems to be amplifying the retreat from facts. «These are wonderful times for motivated reasoners. The internet provides an almost infinite number of sources of information from which to choose your preferred reality,» says Hornsey. «There’s an echo chamber out there for everyone.»

Compounding the problem, fake-news websites that publish hoaxes, conspiracy theories and disinformation disguised as news have proliferated in recent years. But the recent focus on fake news might be doing more harm than good, some experts say. «Now that we have this idea that there is fake news, we can credibly attribute anything we dislike to fake news,» says Campbell.

In the past, climate-change skeptics might have tried to pick apart the details of a study or demonstrate a researcher’s conflict of interest to cast doubt on the evidence. Now, they can simply allege that the media can’t be trusted to report the truth, and wipe away inconvenient facts with a single stroke. «Mistrust of the media is a powerful tool for motivated reasoning,» says Ditto.

License to ignore reality is a dangerous path to travel, regardless of your political leanings, Kahan adds. «It’s a good thing in our political culture that facts have been the currency of our discourse on disputed issues. If facts are somehow devalued as a currency, it’ll be a lot harder to achieve our common goals.»

The root of the problem

What can be done to restore our faith in facts?

Media literacy is one place to start. A report by researchers from Stanford University’s Graduate School of Education found students in middle school, high school and college were terrible at evaluating the quality of online information (Stanford History Education Group, 2016). Though the authors described their findings as «bleak» and «dismaying,» the silver lining is that kids can be taught to be better consumers of information—by, for instance, learning to pay closer attention to the source, consider possible biases or motives and think about what details a news source might have left out.

But given our cognitive biases, teaching can only get us so far. «Motivated reasoning is not something that’s open to view through introspection or conscious effort,» says Kahan. «I’d put more hope on a strategy of improving the science communication environment.»

That’s where Hornsey is focusing his efforts. In a new paper, he describes what he calls attitude roots—the fears, ideologies, worldviews, vested interests and identity needs—that motivate us to accept or reject scientific evidence. He argues that communicators must do a better job at identifying those roots and adjust their persuasion attempts accordingly (American Psychologist, in press). «This is what we call jiu jitsu persuasion: working with people’s motivations rather than trying to fight against them,» he says.

So, for example, want to convince a vaccine skeptic that immunizations are safe? First it helps to figure out if they believe in Big-Pharma conspiracy theories, if they’re fearful of medical intervention or whether they want to prove to their social circle that they’re a concerned parent.

«The key question is not ‘Why do they disagree with the science?’ but rather, ‘Why do they want to disagree with the science?'» Hornsey says.

Answering that will probably require doing something people in our increasingly polarized political climate are loathe to do: Less talking, more listening.

People communicating the facts often do so with the implication that the target is a bad person at worst, or uneducated at best, Campbell says. But an adversarial approach isn’t likely to change minds.

That’s a lesson cosmetics companies learned long ago: They figured out they’ll sell more lipstick if they promise to enhance a woman’s natural beauty rather than tell her she’s ugly, Campbell points out. People who communicate information would do well to heed that example. That goes for scientists and science communicators, but also for anyone who can share an article with hundreds of people with the click of a button—which is to say, almost everyone in today’s digital landscape.

«One of the most important ways to inoculate people from false information is to befriend them,» Campbell says. «There’s a time for the middle finger, and a time to put it away.»